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The 2020 Democratic Primary field was the most diverse in history but narrowed to 
two septuagenarian white men, Joe Biden and Bernie Sanders, with the former 
winning the primary. Many candidates of color and women candidates left the race 
before voting began; consequently, many voters were not able to vote for a candidate 
who was not a white man. “Electability,” a state in which a candidate is perceived to 
have qualities that make success in a general election likely, frequently arose in media 
discussions of the candidates. This thesis examines the media frames surrounding 
electability by analyzing the myths that explain Hillary Clinton’s 2016 loss, which 
elevate different demographics as important for Democrats to win over for success in 
2020. It then investigates how their concerns inform two contradictory prototypes for 
what an “electable” candidate looks like and the impact these prototypes have had on 
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 The results of the 2016 election were undoubtedly a seismic shock to many 
political observers and the Democratic party’s faithful voters. Donald Trump’s 
unexpected victory and Hillary Clinton’s devastating loss reverberated profoundly in 
the days after November 8, 2016. Emotions ran high and protests against the 
president-elect occurred in cities across the United States. In the ensuing years, 
activists opposed to Trump have formed movements, like the #Resist movement on 
social media, dedicated to pushing back against the administration’s policies. 
Beginning the day of Trump’s inauguration, there has been a yearly Women’s March 
in Washington, D.C. in response to the policies of Trump’s administration. In the 
2018 midterm elections, Democrats flipped 40 Republican-held seats in the House of 
Representatives, including many in districts Trump won (Timm). In short, there is 
substantial civic engagement in opposition to Donald Trump. As the 2020 Democratic 
primary race has gotten underway and a record number of candidates have filed to 
run, one topic repeatedly emerges in conversations about each candidate—their 
“electability.”  
 Broadly speaking, “electability” refers to a state in which a candidate has or is 
perceived to have qualities that will make them successful in a general election. The 
determination of who is “electable,” however, is subjective and often depends on 
individual perceptions of what others will want in a nominee. Consequently, such 
determinations are often impacted by societal expectations and prejudices. As of this 
writing, Joe Biden, Barack Obama’s vice president, is the presumptive Democratic 
nominee, after the race narrowed to him and Bernie Sanders, both septuagenarian 
white men. Hence, the United States looks poised to add yet another white male 
president in the fall, despite the fact that the field of Democratic candidates was, at its 
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apex, the largest and most diverse in history (McDonald). In an election where 56% of 
voters rank electability as their primary concern over a candidate’s agreement with 
them on issues (Seitz-Wald), the rhetoric surrounding candidates and their electability 
may partially explain not only which candidates have been successful in the contests 
thus far but also why some candidates who ended their campaigns struggled in the 
polling or fundraising needed to keep their campaign going until the Iowa Caucuses in 
early February.  
 This paper will investigate the concept of electability in relation to the 2020 
Democratic primary by analyzing the media frames discussing the candidates’ 
chances in a general election against Donald Trump. These discussions of electability 
tend to focus on how candidates will appeal to demographic groups in the electorate, 
consequently prioritizing the perceived needs of different identity groups over the 
other. In tandem with exploring how the needs of different voters are elevated over 
others, I will also focus on the ways such frameworks implicitly and explicitly 
intersect with candidate identity; specifically, how the frames do (or do not) 
negatively impact the perceived electability of women and minority candidates. In 
doing so, I hope to provide more insight into a barrier that both women and candidates 
of color face when campaign for the presidency.  
This paper will first analyze the political myths (following Murray Edelman) 
that explain Hillary Clinton’s 2016 loss. These myths also explain why these voters 
either shifted toward Trump or did not vote, with many arguers suggesting strategies 
in response to these causes that Democrats should use to be successful in 2020. This 
paper will then investigate how these proposed strategies frame certain traits as more 
electable than others and how the media frames candidates who are perceived to have 
these traits.  
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 Key to my analysis are two theoretical frameworks: Murray Edelman’s 
conception of political myth, and Linda Coleman and Paul Kay’s notion of 
prototypes. The first explains how the language used to describe political problems 
evokes a set of “pre-structured cues” that give simple explanations, and consequently 
simple solutions, for such problems (Edelman 14). This paper will investigate both the 
myths about Hillary Clinton’s 2016 election loss (the “political problem”) in addition 
to the myths surrounding which candidate is most electable against Donald Trump in 
2020 (the solution to the political problem). This latter area of analysis will rely on 
Coleman and Kay’s work to help explore precisely what media frames are proposing 
makes a candidate “electable.” Using the word lie as an example, they argue that the 
checklist view of how to define semantically complex words—a finite set of features, 
each of which has to be met—is too restrictive, and that whether a given situation or 
action meets a definition instead operates on a gradient, with the degree a certain 
action meets the word’s definition dependent on how many of the characteristics it 
meets (26-28). In the case of the word lie, for instance, they identify three conditions: 
falsity, intent to speak falsely, and intent to deceive; the degree to which different 
scenarios were considered by participants to be a lie depended on how many of these 
conditions the scenarios met (43).  
 This paper argues that there are two distinct media prototypes, largely at odds 
with one another, about which candidates are electable in 2020. The first relies on 
assumptions that white working-class voters can deliver Democrats the presidency 
and consequently rewards candidates thought to appeal to that group, while the latter 
views young people and people of color as the key to electoral success and tends to 
promote candidates who will appeal to that group. These follow from two distinct 
myths that emerged about the cause of the 2016 election—the first that the white 
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working-class defected from Obama to Trump in large numbers and the second that 
black voters did not turn out in sufficient numbers at the polls. The following section 
























Chapter 1: Electability and Identity in US Politics 
For decades, “electability” has been a metric that candidates, the media, and 
voters alike use to describe and evaluate political campaigns during a primary 
election. In this context, the electability of a candidate refers to the likelihood that 
they will win the general election, rather than just the primary nomination for their 
respective party (referred to as their viability) (Rickershauser and Aldrich 372). 
Previous studies have found that voters’ perceptions of a candidate’s electability do in 
fact impact their preferences. Jill Rickershauser and John Aldrich, for example, found 
that voters presented with articles describing a candidate as “electable” rated said 
candidate more favorably; as voters use these evaluations to “form preferences [of one 
candidate over another],” (379) such perceptions, regardless of if they are accurate, 
are vital to a candidate’s chances in a primary election. Further studies have found 
that candidate preference is impacted by electability; Elizabeth Simas found that 
research subjects consistently selected the candidate represented as the most electable 
by at least 12% (Simas 282) when reading news coverage of a simulated primary for a 
House of Representatives seat.  
Other studies have further explored the impact of media framing on voters’ 
perceptions of a candidate’s chances in a potential general election. Philip Jones, Paul 
Brewer, and Dannagal Young, for instance, looking at the impact of media 
discussions of Mitt Romney’s 2012 campaign, found that voters exposed to one 
segment of news coverage that discussed the candidate’s chances against Obama 
favorably rated his electability higher than those who viewed news segments that did 
not mention the candidate’s general election prospects (181-182). Hence, media 
discussions of electability do have an impact on voter’s perceptions of candidates and 
are consequently worth examining. Which candidates receive positive media framing 
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of their electability varies, however. The next section of this paper explores the 
candidate qualities that impact perceptions of electability.  
Ideology 
 
Beyond how a candidate will fare in a direct match up against an incumbent, 
concerns about electability also focus on how they will appeal to the general 
electorate composed not only of that party’s voters but also independent voters and 
moderate voters from the other party. In this facet of electability, discussions of a 
candidate’s ideology—that is, how moderate or extreme they are perceived to be—is 
framed as the key to understanding their chances.  
Rickershauser and Aldrich posit that primary candidates “differ little over 
ideology and policy stances,” instead arguing that candidates work to differentiate 
themselves by which policies they prioritize (371). Other studies, however, take 
candidates varying in ideology as a given—and find that it does impact vote 
preference, but often in concert with electability concerns. Simas, for instance, 
presented her research subjects with three candidates all framed by simulated news 
coverage with slightly different ideologies—a moderate one (who she names 
“Thomas”) an “extreme” candidate (she names “Williams”), and a candidate in 
between (she names “Johnson”) . She finds that voters who preferred Johnson shifted 
their voting preference to Thomas when the latter was presented as more electable, 
but supporters of Williams, the most extreme candidate, did not move their support1 
(285). Mohammad Morhosseini analyzes the effect of ideology in context of primary 
voters’ perceptions of the incumbent officeholder. He finds that primary voters of the 
non-incumbent party who believe the population median—that is, the median 
 
1 The study only examines the effect of a more moderate candidate being framed as electable, not if the 
same holds true if the extreme candidate is presented as the most electable.  
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ideology of most voters in the general election—to be more in line with the incumbent 
party will devote more consideration to electability (469). In other words, if 
Democrats perceive that the median voter is more aligned with Republicans 
ideologically, they will become more concerned about the electability of their 
candidates. Morhosseini theorizes that this phenomenon could partially explain why 
John Kerry won the 2004 primary—voters regarded the median voter as closer to the 
Republican party, and so chose Kerry over Howard Dean, who was perceived as more 
liberal (466). The narrative surrounding Kerry did at least partially rely on his 
electability—over 50% of voters in several early primary states, including Missouri 
and Delaware, ranked Kerry’s top quality as “can beat Bush” by well over 50% 
(Nichols). Of course, voters’ perception of a candidate’s electability does not mean 
they will win—Kerry lost both the popular vote and the Electoral College to George 
W. Bush. Morhosseini suggests that the same may hold true for past Republican 
Primaries, pointing to John McCain’s appeal with swing votes as a reason why he was 
successful in the 2008 primary (458). Again, voters’ perceptions turned out to be 
incorrect—much like Kerry, McCain lost the popular vote and the Electoral College.  
The next section will explore how specific conversations about electability 
occur in tandem with discussions of candidates’ gender and race. The conversation is 
two-fold: the media discussion often focuses on both the identity of the candidates 
themselves and the voters they are trying to court. The latter discussion is particularly 
important to the analysis in Chapter 3, as analyses of a candidate’s electability both 
often focus on their ability to win over one or more subgroups of voters.  
Gender and Electability 
Candidates  
There are no successful female presidential candidates that women can point 
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to as precedent that their own campaign will result in the presidency. Karrin Varsby 
Anderson has written at length about the unique rhetorical challenges that punish 
women when voters are concerned about electability, describing what she calls the 
“first-timer/frontrunner double-bind,” in which women presidential candidates must 
have lengthy political resumes in order to be considered “serious” contenders, but are 
lambasted for such careers, which become framed as “antidemocratic entitlement,” 
once they enter the race (“Presidential Pioneer” 534). Metaphors that situate a 
candidate’s ideological moment are also further impacted by sexism. Kristina Sheeler 
and Anderson note that male political candidates have often benefitted from the 
pioneer metaphor, which posits them as a mythic hero ready to tackle unknown 
challenges like those of the frontier (20). However, they note such framing is more 
detrimental to women’s candidacies because of “the way [the frontier metaphor] has 
been appropriated in the American psyche as something entirely masculine” (20). 
Rather, they note that framing women candidates as “pioneers” frames their 
campaigns as symbolic ones that pave the way for others—rendering them unserious 
candidates (17).  
Political science analysts have found evidence that how voters perceive 
women’s ability to participate in politics can impact their voting behavior. Ana Braic, 
Mackenzie Israel-Trummel, and Allyson Shortle, analyzing exit polls from the 2016 
election in Oklahoma City and a national post-election survey (Survey Sampling 
International), conclude that white voters who agree with the idea that men are more 
suited for politics than women were more likely to vote for Trump over Clinton; in 
the Oklahoma City poll, this was especially true of white women, while the national 
survey found no gender difference (296; 299). While they did find that some non-
white voters did express sexist views, they conclude that it did not impact their vote 
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choice; rather, the impact sexist views of women’s fitness for office was limited to 
white voters for the 2016 election (294). What is not recorded in this study, however, 
is if these voters would have chosen to vote for the Democratic candidate if the 
candidate were a man, a detail that may be able to shed more light into the impacts of 
a candidate’s gender on their electoral success. Further, Clinton was historically 
unpopular (Saad) and remains the only female presidential nominee from a major 
party, so it is difficult to know if the results will hold for other female nominees.  
However, other studies find further evidence that preexisting notions about 
women and leadership impact voters’ perceptions of women candidates. Bligh et. al 
had participants complete a questionnaire about their perception of women in 
leadership prior to reading either a positive or negative article about Senator Barbara 
Mikulski—those who came in with more negative views tended to rate Mikulski’s 
competence more negatively those who held positive ones (573). Interestingly, 
however, no difference was found in the participants’ rating of Mikulski’s likability 
(573). The researchers did find, however, that participants who read positive news 
articles about Mikulski rated her more highly on warmth, likability, and competence 
(575). The primary focus of this paper is not to research how gendered terms like 
“likability”2 have been applied to female candidates in the 2020 cycle; however, 
electability concerns are often grounded in how voters believe others will react to 
candidates. Given that the most recent presidential election featured a woman 
candidate who was consistently disparaged by voters and often the media as “cold” 
and “unlikeable,”3 concerns about the sexism of the electorate impacting perceptions 
of female candidates invariably rise in discussions of electability.  
 
2 Kathleen Hall Jamieson’s Beyond the Double Bind: Women and Leadership explores how these terms 
and others like them are disproportionately applied to women and consequently place women 
candidates in difficult rhetorical situations.   




The so-called “gender gap”—that is, the number of women who voted for a 
candidate minus the number of men who voted for the candidate—has long been a 
way analysts examine horse race coverage in elections, despite the fact that it is less 
of a factor in determining election outcomes than other factors like race, ethnicity, and 
socioeconomic status (Ford 86). Despite the fact that gender is less predictive than 
other demographic types, Lynne Ford contends that analysts continue to group women 
as a cohesive voting bloc because of their large size and high rates of turnout, and 
because the idea of “a political ‘war of the sexes’ is more socially acceptable than war 
between the races or economic classes” (90). References to the gender of women 
candidates’ supporters is also common. In her analysis of eight campaigns, Erika Falk 
found that media frames highlighted the gender of women candidates’ supporters 
more often than they did the gender of the supports of the male candidates who were 
most similarly situated in the polls (132).  
That said, there has been research that in some circumstances, women voters 
do support women candidates at larger rates than men—a 2004 study of data on 300 
House of Representatives races by Craig Brians found that Republican women were 
more likely to vote for a Democratic woman, but Democratic women were less likely 
to cross party lines and do the same (367). Congressional races, where those elected 
serve in deliberative bodies, may not be equivalent to presidential or gubernatorial 
races where the candidate is elected to an executive position. Only 44 total women 
have ever been elected governor in the United States (Rutgers University), however, 
making studies on a similar scale to House races impossible.    
Race and Electability 
Candidates 
 Frames surrounding voters and their racial identity also tend to group black 
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voters into a monolithic bloc with disparate interests from those of white voters (and 
vice-versa). Perhaps unsurprisingly, references to race have been found to arise more 
often in articles about elections where at least one candidate is non-white, as opposed 
to elections where all candidates are white (Caliendo and McIlwain 64). Caliendo and 
McIlwain, in their analysis of news frames in nine 2004 Congressional races, 
conclude that such media frames may be reporters’ ways to make a race feel 
“newsworthy,” especially if it is uncompetitive (65). Catherine Squires and Sarah 
Jackson’s analysis of media frames in the 2008 primary find that racial references 
often referred to identity groups in blocs that focused on how the group would vote as 
a whole, rather than individual voter behavior—mentions of black voters in the early 
2008 primary for instance, focused on themes like if voters considered Obama “black 
enough” (386). They further find that the mention of black voters was more frequent 
during early primary season—once white voters began voting for Obama (thus 
demonstrating that he was not only a candidate for the black community), the 
reference to black voters dramatically decreased (380).  
Voters 
 Scholars have also concluded that a candidate’s race impacts how voters 
perceive their ideology—and consequently, their electability. White voters, for 
instance, have been shown to perceive black candidates as more liberal than white 
ones, especially in low-information elections where they may be unaware of the 
candidates’ platforms (McDermott 912; Lerman and Sadin 158). Amy Lerman and 
Meredith Sadin found that black voters, by contrast, particularly black conservatives, 
are more likely to project their own ideologies onto black candidates (158). In races 
where ideology plays a key role in narratives about which candidate is “electable,” 
then, the race of the candidate may subsequently impact voters’ perceptions of their 
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chances in a general election. Black identity, of course, is not the only identity that 
impacts vote choice—voters’ whiteness also has an effect. Gregory Petrow et. al, for 
instance, studying voter data from five elections, including both presidential elections 
where Obama was on the ballot, found that black candidates on the ballot (e.g. 
President Obama, Deval Patrick, governor of Massachusetts) cue white racial identity 
as a group, resulting in less white voters choosing the black candidate (217).  
 These academic understandings of electability will help inform the subsequent 
analysis of why specific candidates are centered in media frames as particularly 
“electable.” The context of the 2016 election is equally important for understanding 
why specific candidates are highlighted as particularly electable; narratives about why 
Donald Trump won, many of which feed into the academic understandings of 
electability above, further inform the modern-day debate about who can defeat him in 
2020. The next section of this paper analyzes the predominant media frames in the 
2016 election in order to give context for the media frames surrounding electability in 












Chapter 2: The 2016 Election Narrative 
Like all elections, the 2020 election is not a singular, isolated event; much of 
the discourse surrounding which candidates are most suited to win the general 
election includes discussions of what happened in 2016. For many Democrats (and 
arguably, some independents and moderate Republicans), 2016 was a devastating 
loss; not only did Hillary Clinton, the first female presidential nominee from a major 
party win the popular vote but lose the Electoral College, she did so to Donald Trump, 
whose campaign was dominated by flagrant prejudice against a myriad of groups. 
That Trump’s win came as he lost the popular vote by nearly 3 million votes (46.4% 
of the electorate to Clinton’s 48.5%), the largest margin since Rutherford B. Hayes 
lost the Electoral College but won the popular vote by 3% in 1876 (Krieg), further 
imprinted the devastation of the loss.  
Polling and media coverage of the race in the months leading up to Election 
Day undoubtedly played into this shock, repeatedly framing Clinton as the probable 
victor; major outlets repeatedly gave her between a 60 and 85 percent chance of 
winning the election (Valentino, King, and Taylor 110). Moreover, news frames 
repeatedly emphasized the probability of a Clinton win, with analysists in major 
newspapers, like James Hohmann of the Washington Post, proclaiming in October 
that “Trump has little or no room to grow” in support and that popular vote polling 
suggested he was going to face “a landslide loss in the electoral college.” Many 
analysts also gave Clinton a high probability of winning the election—Reuters 
declared two days before the election that she had “a 90% chance” of winning 
(Tamman), and FiveThirtyEight, a site that specializes in analysis of polling, had the 
most conservative estimate, but still showed Clinton with a 72% chance of winning 
the presidency (FiveThirtyEight, “2016 Election Forecast”).  
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In the weeks and months after the election, experts proposed various 
explanations about why Trump’s win was so widely unpredicted; the narratives that 
formed in the wake of these explanations play a large role in determining which 
candidates are labeled “electable” the 2020 Democratic primary. These narratives 
contain two basic elements that contribute directly to conceptions of electability: 1) 
who the voters that chose Trump (or stayed home) were and 2) why they voted for 
Trump over Hillary Clinton (or chose not to vote).4 The following section explores the 
media frames that contributed to these narratives and what they suggest to voters 
about the ideal candidate for 2020.  
Methodology 
Post-mortems of 2016 arguably continue today; however, my primary analysis 
will focus on articles and opinion pieces that appeared in major national newspapers 
(e.g The New York Times, The Washington Post, CNN) from November 9, 2016, the 
date of the election, to December 31, 2017—once 2018 began, political analysis 
began focusing more heavily on the impending midterm elections.  
Those voting in the Democratic primary (and thus those whose decisions may 
be impacted by discussions of Democratic candidates’ electability) are largely either 
Democrats or Democratic-leaning independents. Only seventeen states allow for open 
presidential primaries, where anyone, regardless of party affiliation, can vote in either 
parties’ primary, compared with twenty that have closed primaries (voters must be 
registered with a party to vote in their primary) and eleven that have partially open 
(only unaffiliated voters and voters registered with that party can vote in a primary) 
(Su and Panetta). I am focusing primarily on how these discussions have impacted the 
 
4 There are also voters who left the presidential contest blank, but they do not appear to generate much 
media interest and consequently are not analyzed here.  
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perceptions of the Democratic voters in the primary electorate, and so have chosen not 
to include media frames from right-wing sources that such voters tend to disregard as 
unreliable and likely do not factor into their decisions, including Fox News.5 
Articles for this section were found via searches of both news websites and the 
internet at large for articles during the above time frame that contained the terms 
“why Clinton lost,” “why the Democrats lost,” “why Trump won,” “Trump won 
because,” and “Clinton lost because.” Once I identified both myths analyzed below, I 
searched for additional articles via the search terms “white working-class voters 
Trump [or Clinton],” “Midwest voters Trump [or Clinton],” “black voters turnout,” 
“low minority turnout Clinton [or Trump]” to further explore the discourse 
surrounding these understandings. The pieces selected are examined primarily 
through linguistic and rhetorical methods, including close reading, that focus on how 
word choice and article structure frame the reasons for Clinton’s loss in 2016. The 
following section explores two distinct myths for Clinton’s loss—the first is primarily 
advocated by white journalists and commentators, while the second includes both 
non-white and white journalists and pundits.  
White Working-Class Voters 
The first and arguably most dominant myth to emerge was that white working-
class voters handed Trump a decisive victory. Clinton won the nationwide popular 
vote by 2.76%, nearly three million votes (Krieg). She lost the Electoral College, 
however, by roughly 80,000 voters in Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania, all 
states she lost by less than one percent and that would have given her an Electoral 
College victory had she won them (Bump “80,000 People”). During the immediate 
 
5 A Pew Research Study found that 77% of liberal Democrats and 48% of moderate/conservative 
Democrats distrust Fox News (Jurkowitz et. al).  
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post-mortem analysis of what happened to Clinton’s campaign, many analysts 
focused on a large subsection of voters in those states: white working-class voters 
without a college degree. Democratic candidates have lost that group of voters before 
and still won presidential races—among all whites without a college degree, 2012 
GOP nominee Mitt Romney won this demographic by a margin of 61-36%; however, 
Trump won their support by 66-29% in 2016, a marginal improvement that 
contributed to his electoral college win (Bump “Central Question 2020”). The media 
frames that emerged most quickly after the election, however, not only cemented this 
group as an identity bloc much like the analyses above discuss for minority 
candidates, but as the determining factor for Trump’s success and consequently the 
only voters who matter for the 2020 general election.  
Headlines in the days after the election repeatedly framed white working-class 
voters as the definitive reason Trump won:  
1) How Trump Won: The Revenge of Working-Class Whites (Washington 
Post) 
2) Why Trump Won: Working-Class Whites (The New York Times) 
3) Yes, Working-Class Whites Really Did Make Trump Win. No, it Wasn’t 
Simply Economic Anxiety (The Washington Post)  
4) Huge Margins Among Working-Class Whites Lifts Trump to a Stunning 
Election Upset (ABC News)  
 
Each of these headlines (none of which refer to opinion pieces) posits “working-class 
whites” as a monolithic group whose choices directly contributed to Trump’s success, 
absent any other explanation for the election results. In doing so, especially 
immediately after the election, the frames work to cement the “white-working class” 
as the group that definitively handed Trump the election—and consequently, the 
group that Democrats need to persuade in 2020 in order to win the White House.  
Such frames, of course, are not limited to the headlines alone; much of the 
rhetorical work developing media frames happens in the body of articles. Repeatedly, 
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such articles characterize Trump’s win among the group as a definitive representation 
of a change in the electorate. New York Times analyst Nate Cohn, for instance, writes: 
“Trump won the presidency by riding an enormous wave of support among white 
working-class voters.” The use of the phrase enormous wave frames Trump’s support 
among the group as outsized and consequently extremely significant for his election. 
John Cassidy of the New Yorker echoed this sentiment:  
[Trump] achieved the Brexit-style upset he had promised, riding a surge of 
turnout among white working-class voters to carry the Southern states of 
Florida and North Carolina, put a scare in the Clinton campaign in 
Virginia, and then stormed across the Midwest and the Rust Belt, breaking 
through Clinton’s so-called “blue wall,” and picking up Iowa, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and perhaps Michigan [had not been called at 
time of article]. 
 
The vivid imagery Cassidy deploys here, presenting Trump as riding a surge, 
storm[ing] in states with white-working class voters, and breaking Clinton’s “blue 
wall,” presents Trump’s win as aggressively decisive and further reinforce the idea 
that Trump’s victory with the white-working class was so large it represented a 
groundswell movement, rather than the marginal victories that handed him the 
presidency. As mentioned above, however, group identification is just one half of the 
myth; news frames also explore the why this group voted for Trump over Clinton, 
forming the foundation for arguments about 2020 candidates’ electability. By and 
large, these myths portrayed the Democratic Party as out-of-touch with the concerns 
of the electorate at large, represented by the concerns of these white-working class 
voters.  
Economic Hardship 
 One of the most prominent frames featured in the explanations for why these 
voters chose Trump over Clinton, even if they had voted Democratic in the past, was 
that their economic situation was so dire they had no choice but to vote for the 
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candidate promising them “change.” Jim Tankersley, for instance, then covering 
economic policy for The Washington Post, characterizes their plight by writing “For 
the past 40 years, America’s economy has raked blue-collar white men over the 
coals,” vivid imagery that victimizes this subsection of voters and consequently 
villainizes those who have contributed to the status quo (the economy) that enabled 
that victimization. Tankersley goes on to specifically frame Trump as the hero for 
these voters, calling him “the first major-party nominee of the era to speak directly 
and relentlessly to their economic and cultural fears,” further characterizing economic 
policy as central to these voters’ choices.   
 Author Sarah Jaffe, in an op-ed for The New York Times, connects the 
dissatisfaction among voters back to the 2008 financial crisis, when large banks were 
bailed out after financially harming the American people. Jaffe argues that this anger 
continued in voters who chose Trump:  
If Donald J. Trump stood out to voters from the rest of the Republican 
Party, aside from a willingness to say directly the kinds of things usually 
carefully dogwhistled, it was in his rants about trade and his lack of 
interest in dismantling the remnants of the welfare state. For white 
Americans anxiously looking at their disappearing stability, Mr. Trump 
was a bomb they were willing to throw at a system they felt was failing 
them. He emotionally echoed their outrage and gave them a place to direct 
their anger, the age-old right-wing populist trick of refracting it both 
upward at elites and downward at minorities. 
 
Jaffe’s argument here does note that Trump’s racism—noted by his tendency to say 
things that are “carefully dogwhistled”—likely factored into voters’ perceptions of 
Trump, the core of what she claims made Trump  “stand [out] to voters” was his 
economic appeals via his “rants about trade.” The vivid imagery Jaffe deploys here—
describing Trump as “a bomb” to throw at a system the white working-class “felt was 
failing them”—characterizes the anger among this group as both volatile and sizeable, 
something that Trump was then able to manipulate because of his outsized appeal to 
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these voters. Jaffe goes on to argue that Trump’s nomination should have made the 
rage “visible,” but that “Clinton opened her arms to disaffected Republicans rather 
than wooing the disaffected within and around her own party,” further framing the 
Clinton campaign as ignoring the needs of a key subsection of voters. She notes that 
what made Trump’s campaign effective was its ability to “g[i]ve them a place to 
direct their anger,” further framing direct appeals to these voters’ concerns as critical 
to electoral success.  
The idea that Clinton and Democrats at large lack an ability to connect with 
the white working-class is also reinforced by arguments from major Democratic 
players in 2016. Bernie Sanders, Clinton’s opponent in the primary election noted 
shortly after the election that he was “deeply humiliated that the Democratic party 
cannot talk to the people from where I come from,” referencing his own background 
in the white working class (CBS News, “Sanders”). Such phrasing reinforces the myth 
that Democrats lack the messaging skills needed to resonate with these voters. 
Similarly, Joe Biden, then the Vice President, was asked by Jake Tapper of CNN why 
he thought Clinton did “so poorly with white-working class voters,” a question that 
presupposes that her performance among this demographic was exceptionally poor. 
Biden responds by arguing that the Obama administration did focus on “the real 
inequities that still exist for working-class and middle-class people who are left 
behind” but that such messaging “wasn’t the central part of the campaign moving 
forward,” again presenting the Clinton campaign as uniquely lacking in appeals to the 
economic concerns of these voters. He further frames the Clinton campaign as 
deficient by saying that he and President Obama, who successfully won election 
twice, did focus on such issues, tying Democratic presidential success to such appeals. 
Both Sanders and Biden ran 2020 presidential campaigns in which they have 
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separately highlighted their appeal to economically disaffected voters, suggesting that 
the myth of white-working class voters being a key constituency for 2020 is 
impacting campaigns as well as media frames.   
Identity Politics as Distraction  
 In tandem with criticizing Democrats for neglecting the economic concerns of 
the white-working class, media frames also cited their focus on “identity politics” as 
the reason for their inability to discuss the issues that mattered to these voters. What is 
meant by “identity politics” in these instances, however, is not always explicitly 
defined, but rather seems to work as a vague referent to appeals to voters other than 
white, straight, cisgender ones.  
For instance, in an CBS News panel the morning after the election, political 
contributor Nomiki Konst said that Clinton could have better appealed to the 
electorate “understanding that it’s the economy, stupid,” and that the Clinton 
campaign relied heavily on “identity politics” rather than presenting solutions “that 
are going to fix” people’s problems, something she claims her opponent did: “Donald 
Trump was saying solutions. I’m not saying that they’re right… but at least he was 
talking about them.” Konst’s reference to the oft-coined phrase “it’s the economy 
stupid” evokes a phrase that organizers used in Bill Clinton’s 1992 successful bid for 
the White House (Kelly); that Konst singles out “identity politics” as the reason 
Democrats were unable to focus on that winning strategy suggests that the former 
campaign strategies are untenable for presidential campaigns. Her use of the phrase 
“but at least” when discussing Trump’s invocation of economic policy seems to 
indicate that discussing economic policies for the white working-class satisfies a bare 
minimum that the Clinton campaign failed to meet, further adding to the impression 
that the campaign did not adequately reach out to these voters. Trump, by contrast, is 
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presented as meeting that bare minimum—albeit not in detail, but Konst’s frame here 
seems to suggest that merely talking about such issues is enough to appeal to these 
voters.  
Even arguers who explicitly define “identity politics” do so by pointing to 
specific appeals to voters who are not the white working-class. Mark Lilla, for 
instance, professor of humanities at Columbia University, in an op-ed entitled “The 
Death of Identity Liberalism” for The New York Times, writes that:  
Hillary Clinton was at her best and most uplifting when she spoke about 
American interests in world affairs and how they relate to our 
understanding of democracy. But when it came to life at home, she tended 
on the campaign trail to lose that large vision and slip into the rhetoric of 
diversity, calling out explicitly to African-American, Latino, L.G.B.T. and 
women voters at every stop. This was a strategic mistake. If you are going 
to mention groups in America, you had better mention all of them. If you 
don’t, those left out will notice and feel excluded. 
 
Here, Lilla identifies what about Clinton’s campaign was “uplifting”—appealing to 
shared American values—and contrasts it with appeals to marginalized groups, 
suggesting that the latter is not uplifting and instead divisive. He furthers this frame of 
divisiveness by claiming that those appealing to identity “had better mention all” 
identity groups. “Had better” is a phrase typically associated with warnings and 
threats, and its use here consequently amplifies the serious risks associated with 
appeals to identity. The consequence of the Clinton campaign failing to adhere to this 
warning—the groups not listed “will notice and feel excluded” suggests that Clinton’s 
invocation of marginalized groups of voters not in the categories he names—which, 
later in the piece, he goes on to note means white men, who he characterizes as 
reacting to “the omnipresent rhetoric of identity.” This idea of identity rhetoric as 
omnipresent, coupled with his description of these appeals as occurring at every stop 
suggests that these “strategic mistake[s]” were a constant theme of the Clinton 
campaign and contributed significantly to her loss.  
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Hillary Clinton as Wrong Candidate 
 Analysts also pointed to Hillary Clinton’s unpopularity with this group as a 
reason for her loss, suggesting that she was fundamentally flawed and that other 
candidates may have appealed to the white working-class more. After discussing Joe 
Biden’s appearance in Pennsylvania, a swing state, just before the election, Joe 
Scarborough of MSNBC (and former Republican congressman) compared Biden’s 
favorability rating in Scranton, Pennsylvania (57%) to Clinton’s (23%), going on to 
argue that “the wrong Democrat may have ran [sic]” (MSNBC “Joe: 2016”).  
 Biden was not the only politician to benefit from the narrative that he could 
have beaten Trump among the crucial white-working class. The day after Clinton’s 
loss, Fredrik deBoer, Writing Across the Curriculum Coordinator at Brooklyn 
College, wrote an op-ed for the Washington Post entitled “Hillary Clinton Lost. 
Bernie Sanders Could Have Won.” After recognizing that Clinton and the Democratic 
party did well with black working-class voters, calling it “a credit to their party and 
their candidate,” deBoer goes on to explain that Clinton did not inspire as much 
turnout as Obama in 2008 and 2012—but that Bernie Sanders would have. Noting that 
Michigan was the state where “Sanders pulled off his most shocking primary victory,” 
he goes on to argue that the Vermont Senator was more suited to success among the 
“suburban white voters” Clinton “needed to win”:  
Clinton struggled to use Trump’s wealth against him, in large measure 
because she herself is an immensely wealthy woman… Sanders would 
have been able to contrast Trump’s ostentatious wealth with his own 
shabby aesthetic. The message writes itself: Trump talks a good game 
about economic anxiety, but why would you trust this New York 
billionaire to put your interests first? The millionaire from New York with 
an entourage of celebrities and the backing of the Democratic money 
machine? Or a small-city New Deal granddad from Vermont who has 
spent his political life working with unions and appealing to economic 
justice and populism? 
 
Here, deBoer’s analysis furthers the idea that the white-working class voters felt 
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“economic anxiety” and Trump was the candidate who best catered to that anxiety. 
His descriptions of Trump, Clinton, and Sanders work collectively to group the 
former two together and distinguish Sanders from them. Both of the former politicians 
are described in terms of excessive wealth (Trump has “ostentatious wealth” and 
Clinton is “immensely wealthy”) in connection with their geographic origins (he is a 
“New York billionaire” and she is a “millionaire from New York”). By contrast, 
Sanders is a “small-city New Deal grandad from Vermont,” all terms that frame him 
as a relatable, economically progressive politician. Clinton is further maligned as 
preoccupied with the support of elites, represented by “an entourage of celebrities” 
and “the Democratic money machine,” both phrases that carry sharply negative 
connotations. Sanders, by contrast, is described as having “spent his political life” 
working for better economic conditions—making him the obvious answer to deBoer’s 
question about who would better appeal to the white working class voters that cost 
Clinton the election. 
What all three explanations contribute to is a myth that because the 
Democratic campaign in 2016 failed to craft a campaign that appealed to white-
working class in 2016, they lost control of the White House. This myth ignores other 
substantial reasons for Clinton’s loss, from voter disenfranchisement to Russian 
disinformation to the Electoral College itself, in ways that profoundly impact 
conceptions of who is “electable.” In all of the explanations above, for instance, the 
onus is placed on the Democratic party to change, rather than any of the other 
institutions that played a role in Clinton’s loss. Further, this myth, in alleging a single 
cause for the Democrats’ loss in 2016 (the decrease in white working-class support) 
proposes a single solution—to win back those voters. Consequently, the solution put 
forth by the myth—that Democrats must put forth a candidate who appeals to the 
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white-working class in the Midwest—does not include solutions to these problems in 
discussions about “electability,” leaving structural barriers faced by voters of color 
(e.g. voter ID laws) either uncovered or secondary to the desires of these white voters.   
Low Turnout Among Minority Voters 
 A secondary explanation for Clinton’s loss emerged in the media—though 
arguably not as quickly or pervasively as the myth that white-working class voters 
delivered Trump the presidency—that a lower turnout rate among minority voters in 
key swing states was the reason Clinton lost. The frames explaining this myth, 
however, are unevenly applied; some news articles render black turnout in 
catastrophic terms, while some frame it as inconsequential to the election results. 
These inconsistencies also exist in the explanations for why black turnout decreased, 
presenting varying explanations as the cause. Taken together, such frames present 
decreased black turnout as more complex than that of white working-class voters 
shifting allegiance to Trump, consequently making the latter the predominant frame 
for understanding 2016—and the voters Democrats should focus on to win the White 
House in 2020.   
 A substantial portion of the media frames focusing on lower black turnout use 
more neutral analytic terms that consequently decrease the emphasis on that turnout as 
a cause for Trump’s success. The day after the election, for instance, Vox ran a piece 
entitled “Low Voter Turnout in a Few Key States May Have Helped Donald Trump” 
(Plumer), a headline sporting hedges—a few, may—that frame the lack of turnout as a 
possible, but not definitive cause of Clinton’s defeat. The body of the article similarly 
relies on uncertain terms, noting that early voting numbers “suggest” that turnout 
overall “wasn’t quite as high as many people expected,” phrasing that frames the 
decrease in minority turnout as small and consequently minimizes the impact it had 
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on the election. A CNN piece the same day attributes Clinton’s loss partially to 
“African American, Latino, and younger voters fail[ing] to show up to the polls” 
(Luhby), more definitive phrasing than Plumer’s, but still less extreme framing than 
the articles focusing on the “revenge” of the white working-class. Luhby also notes 
that “a slightly larger share of black and Latino voters” chose Trump than Romney, 
phrasing that frames the decrease in minority support as minimal and consequently 
not particularly impactful on the election results. While most of the uncertain 
terminology is likely a consequence of the fact that final voting numbers took several 
days after the election to come in, this uncertainty is not present in media frames that 
focused on the increase in the share of the white-working class vote for Trump—
where margins were described as “huge” and immediate post-mortems definitively 
pointed to these voters as the cause for Clinton’s loss. 
 Even months after the election, some analysts’ retroactive looks at the cause of 
Clinton’s defeat downplay the effects of decreased turnout. In May 2017, for instance, 
the New York Times’ analyst Nate Cohn wrote an article minimizing the impact of the 
decreased turnout, claiming that recent statistics on turnout indicate that minority 
turnout “wasn’t the driver of Clinton’s defeat.” His analysis repeatedly downplays the 
impact the decrease in minority turnout had in the election results, noting that the 
scale of “weak Democratic turnout… among black voters… has been exaggerated,” 
effectively minimizing the importance of reports that point to lower minority turnout 
as a cause for Trump’s victory. Building further, he argues that black turnout was 
actually “roughly as we expected it,” thus implying that minority turnout was not so 
drastically different that it can account for the discrepancies between the expected 
election results portrayed by media frames (Clinton wins by a large margin) with the 
result (Trump wins by a small margin). Consequently, he renders minority turnout 
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insignificant to the 2016 election before emphasizing the white working-class:  
Instead, it’s clear that large numbers of white, working-class voters shifted 
from the Democrats to Mr. Trump. Over all, almost one in four of President 
Obama’s 2012 white working-class supporters defected from the Democrats in 
2016, either supporting Mr. Trump or voting for a third-party candidate. 
 
Here, Cohn further frames 2016 minority turnout as inconsequential by emphasizing 
the importance of the shifting vote choices of white working-class voters. In 
describing the impact of the white working-class vote as “clear,” he further frames 
their “large numbers” of votes as the decisive factor in the 2016 election and shifts 
focus away from lower minority turnout as a factor in the election results.   
Some media frames do emphasize the decrease in black voter turnout as 
significant, however. Following the release of a Census Bureau survey in May 2017 
that showed black turnout in 2016 decreased, several media outlets discussed the lack 
of turnout in consequential terms. Politico, for instance, titles their article “Study: 
Black Turnout Slumped in 2016” (Shepard, emphasis mine), while The Hill notes that 
“black turnout fell by seven percentage points” but overall voter turnout “dipped 
slightly”  (Wilson, emphasis mine). The first two emphasized terms carry severe 
connotations that work to frame the decrease in black voter turnout as significant and 
consequently impactful on the 2016 election. That the latter article uses “dipped,” a 
term that implies a small decrease, to describe overall voter turnout, further makes the 
“fall” in black voter turnout seem especially pronounced.  
The solutions suggested to mitigate the problems of black voter turnout are 
similarly disparate—some suggest that Democrats further work on strategies that will 
appeal to those already in the electorate, while others emphasize working to increase 
turnout. The latter strategy stands in sharp contrast to the solutions suggested for the 
white working-class shift to Trump, which is largely unanimous in suggesting that 
Democrats craft policies that will appeal to that group. A May 2017 article in 
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FiveThirtyEight, which uses the results of both the 2016 election and the 2017 special 
election in Georgia’s 6th congressional district to argue that “black voters aren’t 
turning out for the post-Obama Democratic Party,” notes that the lack of turnout may 
mean that Democrats may be forced to “become more reliant on whites without a 
college degree, Hispanics, and Asians” (Ruffini). In doing so, he renders the solution 
for low black turnout to focus more on the white working-class who are struggling—
not only deemphasizing the importance of black voters turning out in 2016, but also 
minimizing the importance of  Democrats making sure they do in 2020. The article in 
The Hill, by contrast, notes that Democrats can “chart a path back to political power 
by boosting turnout even at the margins among Hispanic and black voters” (Wilson). 
Here, Wilson’s use of “even at the margins” suggests that small increases in turnout 
would deliver power back to the Democrats, framing turnout as something that can 
give the Democrats victory in 2020 and elevating its importance.  
Failure on the Part of Black Voters 
 While the white working-class’ support for Trump is framed as a failure on the 
Democratic candidate’s part, the lack of turnout among black voters is often framed as 
a failure by the voters. The day after the election, for instance, US News ran an article 
entitled “Clinton Made Her Case to Black Voters. Why Didn’t They Hear Her?” 
(Williams), a frame that suggests voters neglected to interact with Clinton, rather than 
the other way around. Adding to the considerable agency assigned to black voters by 
the headline, Williams goes on argue that they “didn’t answer the call for Clinton, 
[Obama’s] chosen successor.” The agency assigned here to black voters further 
blames the election results on them rather than Clinton—“didn’t answer” implies a 
level of culpability on the part of black voters for failing to turn out, rather than on 
Clinton for failing to energize them or voter suppression laws for keeping them home. 
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To Williams’ credit, the article later points to earlier focus groups with black voters 
that suggest she “failed to articulate” a message that “resonated with black voters ages 
18 to 37,” adding complexity to the frame initially suggested by the headline. In doing 
so, she further presents the idea that Clinton was the wrong candidate to be successful 
in 2020.  
Still, other news frames emphasize the decrease in turnout among black voters 
as particularly significant, all the while characterizing it as a failure on the part of 
black voters. A PBS News piece at the end of November 2016 reflecting on the 
turnout numbers and characterizing the gap between her vote totals and Obama’s 
2012 totals as a “chasm,” notes that “black and Latino minorities did not turn out like 
they had for Obama and women did not show up for Clinton to the extent that many 
had predicted” (Regan). Much like the frame in the previous section, the minority and 
women voters are the agents here, responsible for “show[ing] up” for the candidate on 
the ballot, rather than the candidate being the agent responsible for bringing those 
voters to the polls. The solution implied by such frames further places the onus on 
black voters to vote for the nominee, again ignoring talk of structural solutions to help 
address barriers such voters face.  
Clinton too Centrist 
  While black voters are sometimes framed as culpable for their demographic’s 
decreased turnout, Clinton is also framed as the wrong candidate for them, much like 
she is in discussions about the white working-class. Rather than being too focused on 
identity issues rather than those that impact the white working-class, however, she is 
framed as too centrist to appeal to the needs of (primarily young) black voters. Such 
arguers typically emphasize the lack of black turnout, rendering it a serious issue that 
needs to be addressed. The PBS piece cited above, for instance, cites “apathy towards 
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Hillary Clinton’s candidacy among the Democratic base” as a potential cause of 
Trump’s victory over the former Secretary of State, implying that Clinton as a 
candidate did not properly inspire turnout among the voters the Democratic party 
relies upon.  
Omri Ben-Shahar, professor at University of Chicago Law School, writing for 
Forbes a few days after the election, for instance, argues that “any Democratic 
candidate should have ridden a wave of anti-Trump sentiment” among the Democratic 
base of “urban, minorities, and more educated voters,” and that Clinton’s failure to do 
so means that the base had “a strong distaste” for her. Having framed Clinton as 
extremely unpopular, Ben-Shahar moves on to explain precisely why he feels Clinton 
was the wrong candidate for this election. Citing Sanders’ supporters wariness of the 
former Secretary of State, he argues that:  
The Democratic party, by contrast, was thought to be on the verge of victory 
and even a sweep of the Senate because it was cold calculated, using its 
ironfisted internal machination to discard the populist candidate and to present 
the then-thought more “electable” Clinton. How wrong that perception turned 
out to be! 
 
Here, Ben-Shahar frames the Democratic party as a manipulative force that promoted 
an unpopular candidate because she was less economically left than Sanders. The 
adjectives used by Ben-Shahar to characterize the Democratic party—cold calculated, 
ironfisted—present both the party and Clinton as a shadowy organization ignoring the 
real desires of the people (“the populist candidate”) in favor of someone who they 
believed was “electable.” In emphasizing “how wrong” their perceptions were, he 
further frames them as incompetent, consequently rendering his solution—having 
nominated Sanders over Clinton—the more sensible one, and as a result, a potential 
road to the White House for Democrats in 2020.  
Even among those who find the Democratic party more at fault for the lack of 
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minority turnout, voter suppression is rarely discussed, despite the massive changes in 
voting rights before the 2016 election, most notably the Shelby County v. Holder 
decision in 2013, which struck down the provision of the Voting Rights Act that states 
who have historically discriminated against minorities voting must get federal 
approval before changing their voting requirements. A little over a year after the 
decision, many states, including some pivotal to the 2016 election, (Florida, Virginia, 
and Wisconsin) enacted new voting restrictions, chiefly in the form of voter ID laws 
that disproportionately harm voters of color (Brandeisky, Chen, and Tigas).  
Peniel Joseph, Founding Director of the Center for the Study of Race and 
Democracy at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin, 
adamantly pushes back against what he calls the narrative that lower black turnout in 
early voting was “a failure of civic action by African-Americans,” instead referring to 
it as “a perfectly-executed voter suppression plan hatched by Republican statehouses 
in the wake of the Shelby decision.” Undoubtedly, the stringent voting requirements 
are as Joseph portrays them—many restrictions are designed that have profound 
impacts on minority voter turnout. When such context is absent from the articles on 
the decrease in black voter turnout, however, the urgency to fix such problems is 
nonexistent. Not a single question on states’ restrictions on voting rights, for instance, 
wa asked in any of the 2016 presidential debates, nor was any question asked until the 
debate in November 20196, despite the dismantling of the Voting Rights Act and 
repeated enactments of voter ID laws and other restrictive measures (Levine). That 
such media attention has been devoted to the needs of the white working-class while 
ignoring the very real suppression of black voters consequently means that 
Democratic voters concerned about electability may very well see the former as a 
 
6 For full disclosure, I am the viewer who submitted the question to MSNBC and the DNC.  
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larger problem, and consequently tailor their preferences to candidates who they 
believe meet those needs—perhaps altogether ignoring the needs of communities of 
color.  
That even the discussions that frame lower minority turnout often came weeks 
or even months after the election itself further reduces the impact such frames could 
have on perceptions of why Democrats lost in 2016. Many of the media frames 
pointing to the white-working class in the previous section were published nearly 
immediately after the election, solidifying a perspective on the cause of the election 
before the voter turnout numbers could even be evaluated. That the narratives about 
the decrease in black turnout not only came later than those about white working-class 
voters but were also less unanimous consequently frames it as less important for 
Democrats to focus on in their 2020 election strategy. Frames surrounding the white-
working class vote, by contrast, tend to be extremely similar in describing their share 
of the vote as dramatically influential and consequently a crucial part of how 
Democrats develop their strategy for the presidential election in 2020. This confusion 
likely allows for further promotion of solutions to help the Democrats win back voters 
in 2020, while other solutions about minority turnout, including how to tackle voter 
suppression, are viewed with less urgency because they do not meet the urgency 
described by the media frames of the white working-class voters.  
The next section of this paper will explore the prototypes of “electability” that 
result from both myths that explain why Clinton lost in 2016, in context of actual 
discussions of the 2020 Democratic candidates. The myths outlined above are integral 
to these frames; the media frames analyzed below often reward candidates’ perceived 
electability based on their presumption that they will either return white working-class 
voters to the Democratic nominee or will drum up enthusiasm that will increase 
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Chapter 3: Media Framing of Electability in the 2020 Democratic Primary 
As seen in the previous chapter, discussions about which candidate is suited to 
beat Donald Trump began immediately in the post-mortem of Hillary Clinton’s 2016 
campaign, with many proposing that other candidates, like Joe Biden, may have 
beaten Trump. Electability has dominated many media analyses of the 2020 
candidates, with many pundits and columnists evaluating the candidates’ chances to 
defeat Donald Trump in November.  
As the 2020 Democratic primary to replace him began in earnest and the 
media began evaluating the candidates, they have developed a working prototype for 
an “electable” candidate, repeatedly highlighting the appeal of some candidates to 
different subsections of the voting population. This chapter will evaluate the two most 
dominant prototypes. The first presents an electable candidate one who can appeal to 
the “median voter,” often represented by the white working-class voters who the 
media portrayed as key to Trump’s victory in 2016. The second, arguably a counter-
prototype to the first, argues that an electable candidate is one who can inspire turnout 
among the Democratic base, often represented by non-white and young voters.  
Candidates 
 This section will overview the major candidates in the 2020 primary and their 
respective polling stances at various points throughout the primary to give a better 
overview of the context of some of these media discussions. The 2020 Democratic 
primary saw a record number of candidates—in total, there were at least 29 major 
candidates. The primary also saw candidates declare very early, with John Delaney of 
Maryland’s campaign becoming one of the earliest campaigns announced (July 2017). 
Debates between the candidates began in June 2019, with the June and July debates 
each requiring two nights of debate because of the sheer number of candidates. 
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Because of the enormity of the race, it is helpful here to lay out a rough sketch of the 
race and its leading candidates. For brevity’s sake, I will not list every candidate here, 
but rather discuss the timeline of the race and their relative standing in national 
polls—with leading candidates generally receiving more media discussion.  
Joe Biden, Vice President to Barack Obama, consistently led polls7 throughout 
the primary, even before he announced his run in April 2019. As of this writing, he is 
now the presumptive nominee. Bernie Sanders, the 2016 runner-up, often took second 
place in polls, though he lagged behind Elizabeth Warren, the Senator from 
Massachusetts, during the late summer and early fall of 2019 (approximately mid-
July-late November). Warren’s campaign ended in March 2020, shortly after Super 
Tuesday. California Senator Kamala Harris, who ended her campaign in December 
2019, experienced a rise in polling numbers in July 2019 after confronting Biden on 
the debate stage about his stance on bussing students to integrate schools, but slipped 
back into the single digits not long after. South Bend, Indiana Mayor Pete Buttigieg 
also experienced a rise in polling in late November, around the time Warren lost some 
(but not all) of the advantage from her summer rise and remained among the top five 
or six candidates. Buttigieg’s campaign ended after the South Carolina primary 
(February 29, 2020). Senator Amy Klobuchar of Minnesota, who  consistently polled 
in the low single digits, often behind Buttigieg and Warren, also ended her run after 
South Carolina.  
New Jersey Senator Cory Booker, the only other black candidate to figure 
prominently in the race besides Harris8, consistently stayed between 2 and 3 percent 
in polling averages before dropping out in mid-January. Two separate billionaires also 
 
7 For consistency, all polling numbers are pulled from FiveThirtyEight’s national polling aggregate 
(FiveThirtyEight, “Democratic Primary National Polls”).   
8 Deval Patrick, former Massachusetts governor, was a candidate from November to early February, 
but never garnered substantial support.  
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entered the race—Tom Steyer and Michael Bloomberg, both from New York. The 
former remained in low single-digit polling for most of his candidacy and dropped out 
after the South Carolina Primary, while the latter, despite a lack of participation in the 
first four primary states, rose sharply in the polls in late December before dropping 
out after Super Tuesday. Not every one of these candidates is focused on in this 
paper—by and large, discussions of a candidate’s electability tend to emerge when 
they rise in polling and are subjected to more media scrutiny—many of these 
candidates above single digits in polling and consequently were little discussed in the 
media.9  
Methodology 
 There is an argument to be made that the 2020 primary began immediately 
after Trump’s election, when Democrats began strategizing on how best to defeat him. 
However, the political media’s focus arguably shifted the primary election when 
major candidates began announcing they were in the race. As such, I have decided to 
focus on articles published between December 31, 2018, when Elizabeth Warren, then 
the best-known candidate, officially entered the race by launching an Exploratory 
Committee (Linskey and Viser), and January 31, 2020, to encompass the range of 
early primary discussions while still stopping before the Iowa Caucuses (February 3, 
2020), to avoid the impacts of those results on media discussions.  
 The media pieces sampled here include straight news stories, op-ed pieces, 
cable news analysis, and questions asked by reporters at the Democratic Debates.  
Like in the previous section, these pieces were found via searches of news websites, 
the internet, and cable news channels on YouTube for key terms that evoke 
electability, including “[candidate name] electable,” “who is electable 2020,” 
 
9 This includes the vast majority of the candidates of color, including Cory Booker and Julián Castro.  
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“[candidate name] can’t win,” “[candidate name] can win,” and “who/which 
candidate can beat Trump.”  I also reviewed the transcripts of the nine Democratic 
debates between this time period for questions that focus on the effects of candidates’ 
policies or appeals on voters in a general election. I have attempted to sample from a 
mixture of authors from different racial and gender backgrounds, though there appear 
to be few black women writing on the topic for major newspapers, likely in part a 
reflection of the lack of diversity in some newspapers op-ed columns. Throughout this 
paper, I have noted where the author’s background may be impacting their argument 
and what the inclusion of these voices reveals about electability.  
I continue to use primarily linguistic and rhetorical methods to examine the 
articles for how they frame candidate qualities and present a prototype for an 
“electable” candidate. Two distinct prototypes of electability are present in the news 
frames analyzed for this paper, and each is dependent upon a different myth of why 
Democrats lost the 2016 election. The first, and arguably more dominant version, 
takes the myth that Democrats failed to appeal to the median voters of 2016, 
represented primarily but not exclusively, by the white working-class; the resulting 
prototype of an “electable” candidate relies on qualities that appeal to those voters. By 
contrast, the second version of electability embraces the myth that 2016’s loss 
resulted from a lack of turnout among Democrats’ base voters, particularly African-
American voters and young people, and that an “electable” candidate for 2020 is one 
with qualities that energize this base.  
Media Focus on White Working-Class  
The myth blaming white blue-collar voters for Clinton’s loss has continued 
throughout Trump’s first term. Several news organizations devote substantial news 
space to understanding the perspectives of these voters, adding to the perception that 
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their voices are critical to understanding the American political electorate. AP, for 
instance, has a news tab on their website labeled “Trump Country,” focused on stories 
that predominately affect this demographic. Likewise, the New York Times frequently 
runs pieces focused on the perspective of voters in these swing states, the vast 
majority of whom are often white and working-class. The Times in particular has 
come under scrutiny for its repeated presentation of only the white voices in these 
states as representative of what the “average” voter thinks. In one particularly stark 
example, one of the voters the paper presented as a voter representative of the 
country’s perception of impeachment had been to 23 Trump rallies and compiled a 
book of Trump’s tweets (Gabriel, Healy, and Tavernise). In short, these voters are still 
omnipresent in political analysis, and their supposed preferences consequently feature 
prominently in considerations of which voters are “electable.”  
Appeal to the “Median” Voters 
 In this view, Democrats’ best chances in the general election lie in nominating 
a candidate who appeals to voters in the ideological middle, often with a particular 
focus on moderate white working-class voters and suburban moderates. There does 
appear to be media recognition that black voters also constitute a portion of the 
country’s moderate voters, but the prototype described below disproportionately 
rewards candidates who have little to no support from black voters but are perceived 
to be particularly appealing to white working-class voters.   
The need to appeal to the median voter is often elevated in importance because 
such voters are framed as more reliable—that is, more likely to vote in the 2020 
election. Atlantic columnist David Frum, in a January 2020 piece entitled “Bernie 
Can’t Win,” directly refutes the Sanders’ campaign’s argument that his candidacy will 
succeed by driving turnout among young people by noting the reliability of more 
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moderate voters. Citing Sanders’ embrace of an endorsement by Joe Rogan, a left-
leaning conspiracy theorist who regularly parrots racist and misogynist talking points, 
Frum notes that Sanders will face election weaknesses because he will struggle to 
appeal to the voters who turn out the most:   
The Sanders campaign is a bet that the 2020 race can be won by 
mobilizing the Americans least committed to the political process while 
alienating and even offending the Americans most committed to it. It’s a 
hell of a gamble, and for what? 
 
The framing here presents moderate voters as integral to winning back the presidency 
because they are the “most committed” to the political process. Speaking of the young 
voters Sanders’ campaign relies on as a “hell of a gamble” further presents appeals to 
non-median voters as risky for success in a general election, damaging the electability 
of any candidate who fails to appeal to those voters. Frum does not wholly oppose 
Sanders’ policies, noting that his emphasis on the “practical” issues (health insurance, 
wages) matter more to voters than “theoretical” ones (democracy, corruption), but he 
argues that Sanders’ electoral problems lie in the fact that Sanders has failed to 
“establish an emotional connection with suburban women and African Americans,” 
acknowledging these groups’ integral role in the electorate.  
 While some arguers do acknowledge that these groups are integral to the 
Democratic base, their concerns are often left secondary to those of white working-
class and Midwestern voters. A Time profile of Pete Buttigieg from May 2019, for 
instance, specifically points to the South Bend Mayor’s appeal to white voters as a 
boon for his candidacy:  
As a white man, Buttigieg may appeal to more traditional voters, yet women 
and voters of color are the heart of the Democratic coalition (Alter).10  
 
 
10 This article and quote are referenced in the Henderson article later in this paper, and I credit her for 
drawing my attention to it.  
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Here, Alter separates white men from all other voting demographics as “traditional 
voters”—the inclusion of yet separates “women and voters of color” from this first 
descriptor.  The word traditional itself implies a level of stability that elevates white 
men’s importance as a group that candidates should appeal to, while the other 
demographics are given the more emotional moniker of being the “heart of the 
Democratic Coalition.” In directly tying Buttigieg’s identity as a white man to success 
with the former group, Alter presents a candidate’s identity as directly related to their 
performance among key demographics in the electorate.  
The sidelining of black voters’ interests often results in candidates who have 
little appeal to black voters being elevated as particularly electable. Buttigieg, for 
instance, has consistently polled around 0% with black voters (Hensley-Clancy and 
Cramer), but is repeatedly elevated as electable because of a perceived appeal to 
Midwestern voters. The following section explores how this focus on “median voters” 
create a prototype of electability that often elevates a candidates’ appeal to white 
voters over their appeal to black voters and other voters of color. 
Candidate Qualities 
Moderate 
As discussed above, if voters believe the median ideology of voters lies more 
with the opposing party, voters increase their focus on electability (Morhosseini 469). 
Because the immediate post-mortem of 2016 posited white-working class voters as 
the ones who turned the election, they become the “median voter” that serves as a 
barometer for the rest of the electorate. The voters cited in these stories tend to be 
ideologically moderate or conservative, rendering the “median voter” in the same 
ideological light. Media discussions of the white working-class voters frequently cite 
candidates’ moderate ideology as evidence of their electability and vice-versa; 
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candidates with ideologies that are characterized as far left, chiefly Bernie Sanders 
and Elizabeth Warren, often have their electability framed negatively. Joe Biden, Pete 
Buttigieg, and Amy Klobuchar, all candidates who are typically framed as 
ideologically moderate, often benefit from this frame as they are rendered palatable to 
the median voter and consequently electable. 
This perspective on electability often characterizes the progressive voters of 
the party—and their preferred candidates—as too idealistic to win against Trump and 
that in order to recapture the White House, the nominee must be moderate 
ideologically. In an April 2019 Washington Post column titled “Joe Biden is the Best 
Candidate to Beat Trump,” for example, David Ignatius writes that:  
Progressive activists within the party are generating ideas and energy that 
could galvanize a country that wants a fairer economy and a cleaner 
government. But none of these ideas will matter unless a Democrat wins. The 
damage Trump would do in a second term might not be undone for decades. In 
thinking about their party's nominee, paradoxically, Democrats must put the 
country first... The need to replace Trump ought to transcend party and 
ideology. 
 
Here, Ignatius divides progressive activism from the success of the Democratic 
nominee, suggesting that the two are incompatible. While he praises the goals of 
progressive activists, his use of the contradiction but implies that the positive ideas 
alluded to in the first half of the passage—the ideas that could “galvanize a 
country”—cannot be rectified with “a Democrat win[ning].” In including the 
“damage” that “might not be undone for decades” in a second Trump term, Ignatius 
implicitly connects the candidates progressives prefer with a Trump victory and 
further harm.  His closing line similarly solidifies that idea; by stating that beating 
Trump “ought to transcend… ideology,” he further suggests that those focused on a 
candidates’ progressivism (or lack thereof) are placing those qualities before their 
ability to beat Trump, and that the inverse should be true for success in 2020. He 
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closes the piece by arguing that “Biden looks most like the person who could beat 
Trump. And that’s Job One,” suggesting that the candidates’ electability is the single 
most important factor in a candidate, and that those who want a progressive candidate 
need to compromise for the sake of the general election.   
The phrase “too far left” is one that has been frequently deployed against 
Democrats at large and individual candidates within the party by analysts, 
Republicans, and moderate Democrats alike. Discussions about whether Democrats 
are “too far left” regularly occur in cable and print discussions of Democratic 
candidates. A Washington Post Magazine piece from November 2019, for instance, 
announces that “The Democrats are Moving Left. Will America Follow?” While 
many of the commentators argue in favor of leftward policy shifts,11 the piece takes as 
its core premise that Democrats are ideologically further left, noting in the 
introduction that the party has “shifted in fundamental ways since the last presidential 
election” (Just), and inviting commentators to discuss the potential merits and 
consequences of the policy shift.  
Questions about ideology have featured in official polls of Democratic voters; 
in October 2019, for instance, a Quinnipiac University poll found that 47% of self-
identified Democrats felt that the party was too far left, compared with 37% of self-
identified Republicans who felt the party was too far right (Cillizza). CNN analyst 
Chris Cillizza argues that these poll results look at a phenomenon that is “less well-
covered” than Republicans shifting rightward, speaking to its importance. He goes on 
to use these results to argue that:  
[The results] should be worrisome for a Democratic Party establishment 
already worried that several of their leading presidential candidates are too 
liberal for the country at large. Remember that the positions that one or several 
 
11 Supporters are often arguing the moral benefits of such polices or pointing to how such a platform 
would be considered centrist in other economically developed countries, rather than explicitly tying 
such policies to electability.  
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Democratic candidates for president had advocated for during the primary 
season so far include: 
Eliminating all private health insurance in favor of a single, government-run 
system 
The "Green New Deal," a massive (and massively expensive) overhaul of the 
way in which we consume and think about energy in this country 
Mandatory buybacks of AR-15s and AK-47s 
Decriminalization of illegal immigration 
These are not views that a majority of the country holds… In some cases -- 
Medicare for All's elimination of private insurance, for example -- what these 
Democratic candidates are for are [sic] not even supported by a strong 
majority of Democrats. 
 
Here, Cillizza frames the ideology of several leading Democrats (he names Warren 
and Sanders early in the piece) as an election liability by putting their perspectives at 
odds with the general electorate. That he claims the Democratic establishment 
themselves are concerned that “several” candidates are “too liberal for the country at 
large” suggests that the ideology of such candidates is so distant from the average 
voter that the leadership of their own party is worried about winning the election. The 
language he uses to frame each of the policies he describes—“eliminating,” 
“massive,” “mandatory,” and “decriminalization” of something “illegal”—all work to 
characterize these policies as extreme ones, further adding to the perception of the 
candidates as outside of the mainstream. He further punctuates the list of policies by 
noting that “these are not views the majority of the country holds,” again placing the 
views of Democrats at odds with the American people. His last sentence extends this 
sense of ideological alienation by noting that not only are the current candidates’ 
views at odds with the electorate in general, but also with members of their own party.  
 Discussions of ideology in relation to this concept of electability often frame 
many of the policy proposals put forth by the candidates, particularly Sanders and 
Warren, as too far outside of the mainstream to result in success in the general 
election. Sanders’ self-identification as a Democratic Socialist is often framed as 
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problematic for his electability.12 Particularly in recent years, Socialism has been 
unpopular with the American electorate at large, with only 39% favorability in 2019 
(Jones and Saad). In the first July Democratic Debate, for instance, moderator Jake 
Tapper noted that voters prefer a candidate who can “beat Donald Trump” over one 
who “agrees with them on major issues” before referencing an ad by then-candidate 
John Hickenlooper decrying socialism as a way “extremes [could] give Trump four 
more years.” He then asked if the Colorado Governor thought “Senator Sanders was 
too extreme to beat Donald Trump.” In asking whether Sanders is “too extreme,” 
Tapper’s question presupposes that Sanders is in fact extreme, framing as distant from 
the median voter.  
 Hickenlooper’s response furthers the frame that the progressive policies put 
forth by other candidates pose a risk during the general election:  
I'm saying the policies of -- this notion that you're going to take private 
insurance away from 180 million Americans who, many of them don't want to 
give -- many of them do want to get rid of it, but some don't -- many don't. Or 
you're going to -- the Green New Deal make sure that every American's 
guaranteed a government job if they want, that is a disaster at the ballot box, 
you might as well FedEx the election to Donald Trump. 
 
Here, Hickenlooper’s relies on descriptions that frame the policies favored by 
candidates like Sanders and Warren as extreme changes to current policies—take 
away from 180 million Americans, every American’s guaranteed a government job.  
His final sentence frames Trump’s reelection as a foregone conclusion if a progressive 
is the nominee. Not only does he call the policies a “disaster at the ballot box,” but  
says that the election can be “FedEx[ed]” to Trump, framing such policies as so 
damaging to Democrats’ support that an entire general election fight would not be 
 
12 The US does have a history of an active socialist party; in the early 1900s, they were successful in 
electing multiple mayors and congressmen and ran Eugene Debs as a candidate for president five times 
(McArdle). However, the Socialist Party’s anti-war stance during World War I caused Debs to be jailed 
(McArdle). Socialism is often also conflated with communism, which became particularly unpopular in 
the US after the Cold War with the Soviet Union (Montanaro and Liasson).   
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able to change the results.  
Much like liberal columnists regularly write about on the fitness of Republican 
nominees and officials, conservative voices also feature in discussions of electability 
in 2020. Washington Post columnist Jennifer Rubin, for example, regularly addresses 
the electability of the 2020 field in her columns. In a September 2019 column 
describing her opinion of Joe Biden’s appeal, she writes:  
Biden shows reverence for the most popular Democrat around, former 
president Barack Obama; others find fault in everything from the Affordable 
Care Act to immigration policy. Biden does not bombard voters with a torrent 
of multi-part plans; he gives them a few basic positions and defends them. 
Biden does not campaign from the neck up; he campaigns with his heart on his 
sleeve. Biden is deeply optimistic; his opponents think Americans are the 
problem, not Trump. (I don’t suggest that his opponents are wrong, merely 
that their stance apparently isn’t as popular as they thought.) Biden wants 
normalcy plus reform; his opponents want a peaceful revolution. Biden knows 
people want to be heard and seen; his opponents (with the exception of Sen. 
Kamala D. Harris) don’t fully grasp this. They want to “help," to pepper 
people with ideas and a to-do list, while Biden takes the time to listen to them. 
(Think of the well-meaning friend who has a thousand suggestions when you 
are grieving and you’d rather they just shut up and commiserate.) 
 
In the above passage, Rubin contrasts Biden with his opponents to frame him as more 
in line with what the average voter believes about various issues—and consequently, 
more able to win their votes in a general election. The attributes she assigns the other 
Democratic candidates frame them as out-of-touch and therefore potentially alienating 
voters in the general election. By characterizing them as “finding fault in everything,” 
Rubin portrays the other Democratic candidates as overly critical ones, in sharp 
contrast to the hopeful tone she presents Biden as providing voters. Her statement that 
Biden “knows people want to be heard and seen” in contrast to his opponents who 
“don’t fully grasp this” portrays the former Vice President as possessing a political 
knowledge the other candidates do not, a trait that speaks positively to his ability to 
challenge Trump in a general election. The fact that she further describes the other 
candidates as pepper[ing] voters, a phrase that carries a negative connotation, coupled 
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with her comparison of them to a friend offering “a thousand” suggestions when 
someone is grieving, further presents everyone but Biden and Kamala Harris as 
isolating to voters and consequently raises doubts about their electability.  
 Rubin further links the other Democratic candidates—most notably Warren 
and Sanders—to radicalism that makes their campaigns non-viable. Warren’s 
presidential campaign has been marked by the candidate’s release of a litany of 
detailed plans to solve issues facing society; Rubin here characterizes candidates 
releasing plans as bombarding voters, a term that implies such plans are being forced 
upon and overwhelming the electorate. By contrast, she frames Biden as “giv[ing] a 
few basic plans,” in sharp contrast to the “torrent of multi-part plans” Warren is 
framed as overwhelming voters with (the Warren campaign’s unofficial slogan was 
“Warren has a plan for that”). Sanders’ campaign is also implicitly referenced by the 
phrase “peaceful revolution”—his campaign explicitly advocates for a political 
revolution, primarily to end the economic disparities between the extremely wealthy 
and the working class—still, “revolution” carries strong connotations of dramatic 
change, generally perceived negatively. The words she uses to describe Biden’s 
campaign—“normalcy plus reform”—both carry more positive connotations and 
consequently Biden’s campaign as the more palatable one for a wider variety of 
voters.  
 Likewise, Lloyd Green, former opposition research counsel to George H.W. 
Bush’s campaign in 1988, wrote a column for The Guardian arguing that Biden’s lead 
in polls is “because electability is a real thing.” On Biden’s ideology, he argues that:  
On the issues, Biden is a mainstream economic liberal, not a wild-eyed would-
be revolutionary. Stridency is not his thing. He is not looking to recreate the 
world anew, and that is reassuring in a world buffeted by Trumpian 
tweetstorms. 
 
Green’s choice of descriptors here work to frame progressives as far outside the 
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mainstream: the use of wild-eyed, would-be revolutionary, and stridency, a word that 
carries negative connotations, all create a sense of extremity that  sharply contrasts 
with Biden’s “mainstream economic liberal[ism].” The sense of normalcy Green 
applies to Biden is furthered by his description of the political landscape under Trump 
as “buffeted by Trumpian tweetstorms,” descriptions that convey a sense of relentless 
chaos. Hence, both Trump and the progressive candidates in the race are framed in 
similar chaotic terms, while Biden is presented as “reassuring” and “mainstream,” 
distinguishing his candidacy as uniquely different from Trump’s.  
The discussions of electability in relation to candidates’ ideologies also 
typically presumes that there are voters who would support a Democrat but would 
vote for Trump if the nominee were too liberal. Neera Tanden, president of the liberal 
think tank Center for American Progress, writing for Washington Post Magazine, 
points to Democratic successes in the midterm elections as a model for the 2020 race:  
In 2020, Democrats can — and should — turn out their base, while 
simultaneously making their case to swing voters. That’s precisely what 
happened in 2018. Participation rates among millennials and people of color 
soared, with the number of Latino voters nearly doubling from the previous 
midterm elections in 2014. But persuadable Trump voters played the more 
important role: According to Catalist, a progressive firm that tracks voter data, 
“Democratic gains were … largely driven by voters who voted for Trump in 
2016 and voted Democratic in 2018. 
 
Here, Tanden frames white Trump voters as a key demographic the Democratic 
nominee must appeal to. While she notes the importance of young voters and minority 
groups to the 2018 midterm results, her use of the conjunction “but” separates Trump 
voters from these groups—in essence, noting that such voters are largely older and 
white. That she elevates this latter group as “more important” to Democrats’ electoral 
success frames their concerns as paramount. The final paragraph of her piece goes on 
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to argue in favor of a health care plan13 distinct from Medicare for All. Citing the 
plan’s appeal among Iowa Democrats, she claims policies like it help build the “broad 
coalition” needed to “beat Trump,” further highlighting the concerns of voters from a 
predominately white state as integral to Trump’s defeat.  
During Elizabeth Warren’s surge over the late summer of 2019, The New York 
Times ran a piece that claimed while “Democrats love [her], they also worry about 
her.” Many of these “worries” cited are ideological in nature; reporter Jonathan 
Martin writes:  
Ms. Warren is facing persistent questions and doubts about whether she would 
be able to defeat President Trump in the general election. The concerns, 
including from her admirers, reflect the head-versus-heart debate shaping a 
Democratic contest increasingly being fought over the meaning of electability 
and how to take on Mr. Trump… These Democrats worry that her 
uncompromising liberalism would alienate moderates in battleground states 
who are otherwise willing to oppose the president. 
 
By labeling the debate one of “head-versus-heart,” a phrase that implies what the 
party at hand (the Democrats) want—in this case, Elizabeth Warren, who is “love[d]” 
by them—is at odds with the logical choice for the nomination, Martin frames 
Warren’s candidacy as idealistic, rather than a realistic approach to successfully beat 
Trump in the general election. Martin’s use of uncompromising to describe Warren’s 
liberalism, coupled with the potential added effect that it would “alienate moderates” 
who “are otherwise willing to oppose the president”—in other words, votes that 
would normally go to a more moderate Democratic candidate—further frame her as 
too liberal to win against the incumbent president in a general election.  
 The entire premise of the article—that while Democrats love Warren as a 
candidate, they do not see her campaign as a viable one—carries vestiges of the 
pioneer candidate metaphor discussed in Chapter 1 of this volume. In particular, the 
 
13 Proposed by her own think tank.  
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characterization of her run for president as one of “heart” (that is, an emotional appeal 
to supporters) rather than “head” (that is, a logical choice about who is best suited for 
the nomination) frames her candidacy as a symbolic one that appeals to the emotions 
of a subgroup of voters (Democrats) rather than appealing broadly to the electorate at 
large.    
 Somewhat paradoxically, the view that moving too far left economically will 
lose votes seems to contrast with the narrative that Trump’s voters chose him because 
he promised them a better economic future—many of the policies Sanders and 
Warren are criticized for being “too far left” on are economic ones that would deliver 
relief to these voters if enacted. However, much like Lilla’s op-ed in the previous 
chapter declared that white voters felt left out when other marginalized groups were 
mentioned, many decrying these candidates’ policies note that Midwestern voters do 
not believe they will benefit from them. Claire McCaskill, for instance, the former 
Missouri Senator who lost reelection in 2018, frequently discusses Midwestern 
voters’ preferences in her current role as an MSNBC contributor. In a post-debate 
panel on the second night of the July 2019 debate, in which several candidates on 
stage, including Montana Governor Steve Bullock and Ohio Congressman Tim Ryan, 
characterized plans like Medicare for All as unrealistic, McCaskill noted that:  
America is generally not as far along the left line as Bernie and Elizabeth. Free 
stuff from the government does not play well in the Midwest, because they’re 
just convinced that they’re not the ones getting the free stuff… If you start 
saying we’re going to let folks coming across the border have no criminal 
penalty… and access to free healthcare through Medicaid programs, then you 
are going to lose a whole slew of voters that are not crazy about Donald 
Trump but are not going to go there… It would be a very difficult thing to 
overcome in states like Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania… the states we 
really need to win.  
 
McCaskill’s core argument here—that the liberal economic policies put forth by the 
“left line” candidates “do not play well in the Midwest”—serves to refute any talking 
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points made by the candidates that their economic policies will bring back voters who 
believed in Trump’s economic message because they do not see themselves 
represented in the policies. Such framing echoes the sentiments seen in the 
explanations of Trump’s win—he gave a voice to the white working class’ hardship—
while still denying that candidates proposing sweeping economic change are the 
solution. McCaskill further trivializes these policies by referring to them as “free stuff 
from the government,” framing them as unrealistic giveaways rather than policy 
proposals designed to help communities. The word stuff in particular, which is often 
used as a casual referent to describe objects that carry little meaning, serves to 
characterize the promises being made by these candidates as trite. That McCaskill 
further characterizes these programs as going to “folks coming across the border 
[with] no criminal penalty,” explicitly touching on the cultural flashpoint of 
immigration, further separates these programs from the white working-class and 
therefore untenable solutions for the Democrats in 2020.  
McCaskill further presents the electoral consequences of these policies in 
drastic terms, saying that nominating a candidate with these views will “lose 
[Democrats] a whole slew of voters that are not crazy about Donald Trump,” implying 
that, though there are candidates who dislike Trump and could vote for a Democratic 
nominee in November, a large margin of these voters would not support a candidate 
who embraced such policies. Her particular focus on Michigan, Wisconsin, and 
Pennsylvania, all three states that delivered Donald Trump the presidency, frames 
Sanders and Warren’s strategies as inadequate in precisely the areas that Democrats 
need to win, consequently rendering their campaigns untenable in a general campaign.  
Success in Red or Midwestern States  
 Much like the long-standing myth that a candidate’s vice-presidential pick will 
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deliver their home state’s electoral votes to the ticket (Kopko and Devine), candidates  
from traditionally Republican states also enjoy an advantage in the media’s framing of 
their electability, based on a presumption that they will be able to court voters in the 
states that Clinton lost. Such candidate success is often treated with a kind of 
reverence that suggests the ability to win over these voters is a kind of political genius 
needed to guarantee the Democrats’ success in 2020.  
Steve Bullock, for instance, the Montana governor whose presidential 
campaign lasted from May to December, was lauded by Politico as the “red-state 
savior Democrats don’t want” (Lizza). The use of the term savior, which carries 
highly positive connotations and implies a sense of reverence, elevates Bullock’s 
candidacy. Lizza further adds to this impression by continually framing Bullock in 
highly positive terms—saying that he has “arguably the most impressive governing 
credentials in the race,” noting that the governor could “brag about re-authorizing 
Medicaid expansion, freezing in-state college tuition in his state, and vetoing a slew 
of conservative bills sent to him by his Republican Legislature.” The use of the phrase 
most impressive, which carries highly positive connotations, coupled with Lizza’s 
assertion that Bullock could brag, suggesting that his accomplishments—all ones that 
satisfy some kind of general Democratic priority—are worth boasting about, all frame 
the governor as uniquely successful in Montana and therefore able to extend that 
success nationwide in a general election.  
 Senator Amy Klobuchar of Minnesota also benefits from this qualification of 
electability. While not one of the states Trump narrowly won in 2016, Minnesota is 
geographically and demographically similar to Michigan and Wisconsin—specifically 
Midwestern, the region treated in the previous section as the definitive reason for 
Trump’s success. Klobuchar’s success there is often touted as a boon to her 
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electability; Washington Post columnist David Byler, making a case for the “second-
tier” candidates’ electability, notes that Klobuchar boosts “eye-popping margins” 
there that warrant her attention from electability-minded voters.  
Following the December 2019 debate, Matthew Yglesias, senior 
correspondent at Vox, ran an article entitled “Amy Klobuchar Deserves a Closer Look 
from Electability-Minded Democrats,” arguing that Klobuchar’s record in her 
midwestern state speaks positively to her electability in a general election.  
The fear that haunts Democrats is that even with Trump unpopular, they could 
beat him by 3 or 4 percentage points in the nationwide vote total and still lose 
if he does well enough in the Midwest, specifically in Wisconsin… Democrats 
don’t currently have a candidate in the field who has run and won in 
Wisconsin… Minnesota is, of course, adjacent to Wisconsin… The 
sensibilities are similar. All things considered, you’d expect any Democrat to 
do better in Minnesota than in Wisconsin. But you’d expect a Democrat who 
does unusually well for a Democrat in Minnesota to also do unusually well for 
a Democrat in Wisconsin. And Klobuchar does very, very well in Minnesota.  
 
Here, Yglesias highlights the centrality of Wisconsin, one of the three states Trump 
won by small margins, to considerations of electability, noting that even a Democrat 
who wins the popular vote by “3 or 4 percentage points” could lose the Electoral 
College because of the state, making the nominee’s appeal there crucially important. 
That he describes Klobuchar as “do[ing] very, very well in Minnesota,” a state with 
“similar sensibilities” to these crucial states, consequently frames her as a potential 
solution to this “fear that haunts Democrats” and gives strong credence to her 
electability in a potential general election competition against Trump.   
 The Midwest is not exclusively white, but the voters and candidates focused 
on for this prototype of electability are predominately so. This extensive focus on 
white voters and their wishes likely owes to the fact that the prototype takes as its 
premise that the party needs to win the support of the white working-class and 
Republicans wary of Trump, the latter group also being overly white. Consequently, 
52 
 
candidates who lack support from black voters—Klobuchar and Buttigieg for 
instance, have both consistently polled near 0% with black voters for the entirety of 
their runs—have been bolstered14 by discussions of their electability with little regard 
for the damage their liabilities with black voters pose in their path to the nomination 
and in a general election where turnout among black voters is key to success.  
Appeal to the Democratic Base 
Almost in direct opposition to the previous prototype of electability, this 
prototype of electability looks for a candidate who can energize the Democratic base 
to turn out in high numbers that override Trump’s voters. Unlike the previous section, 
midwestern voters are not presented here as the key to success in the general 
election—rather, young voters and black voters, both key constituencies for the 
Democratic Party, are centered. Focusing primarily on the drop in turnout among 
African-Americans from Obama in 2012 to Clinton in 2016 (the second myth 
evaluated in Chapter 2 of this volume), proponents of this perspective argue that an 
“electable” candidate will appeal to these constituencies so much that their turnout 
will be enough to tip the election. While those focused on a candidate’s appeal to 
swing voters treat “electable” traits as innate and therefore unchangeable, the rhetoric 
sampled here tends to focus on whether a candidate will be able to build and sustain 
their appeal to voters across the length of a general election, presenting a more 
malleable conception of electable traits. Proponents of this view of electability tend to 
tend to be younger and more liberal and are more likely to be non-white. This 
prototype largely functions as a counter-prototype to the first one, in that it is often 
used to frame Joe Biden’s electability negatively rather than advocate for a specific 
 
14 Klobuchar in particular was endorsed by over a dozen editorial boards (which also largely consist of 





 In direct contrast to the first electability prototype, proponents of this 
prototype often actively push back on the notion that Democrats must court white 
voters to win. Ibram Kendi, Director of the Antiracist Research and Policy Center at 
American University, labels African-American voters “the other swing voter” in a 
January 2020 column for The Atlantic. Noting that there was a drop in young black 
voters in 2016, Kendi delivers a blunt refutation of the idea that white voters are the 
only swing voters in an election:  
The common conception of the swing voter is one who shifts between voting 
Republican and voting Democrat. These center-right or center-left voters are 
typically white and older. Meanwhile, people of color and young people, and 
especially young people of color, are more likely than white people and older 
people to swing between voting Democrat and not voting (or voting third 
party). These are America’s other swing voters. Othered because they are 
typically young and not-white. Othered because they are hardly recognized at 
the table of political agency. Othered because they are primarily recognized at 
the table of political shame when they don’t vote. Othered because Americans 
refuse to recognize how voter suppression and depression affect their agency. 
Quietly, though, they are voicing their agency, declaring the Democratic Party 
irresponsible for the candidate choices it makes, swinging, and deciding 
elections.  
 
The reasons Kendi lists for why these swing voters are othered—they are not granted 
“political agency” by dominant groups, they are shamed for not voting, and the 
barriers to their voting are not a priority—all speak to institutional prejudices against 
racial minorities, something that likely plays to voters’ feelings of “white guilt”—that 
is, white voters’ guilt at the oppression people of color have gone and continue to go 
through. The New York Times’ Astead Herndon noted in October 2019 that explicit 
attention to racial issues is a salient factor for white voters in the primary, even in 
predominantly white states like Iowa and New Hampshire (Herndon). That 
framework of guilt is further impressed by Kendi’s description of these voters 
declaring the Democratic party “irresponsible” for its choice of candidates, suggesting 
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that should the Democratic party fail to nominate someone who speaks to the needs of 
the African-American community, it risks losing the election by not encouraging them 
to turn out.   
Candidate Qualities 
Ability to Energize Key Democratic Constituencies   
 One of the key qualities arguers in this group emphasize is a candidate’s 
ability to excite voters about their campaign and consequently encourage them to turn 
out to vote in a general election. These voters are typically (though not exclusively) 
represented by the subgroups that form the base of the Democratic party—young 
voters, African Americans, Latino voters, and similar groups—overriding the need to 
cater to Republicans and conservative-leaning independents. Arguments supporting 
this prototype of electability tend to rely on the same schema—VOTERS ARE 
INERT AND NEED TO BE ENERGIZED TO VOTE. Candidates are subsequently 
framed based on their perceived ability to drive this energy among the groups 
constituting the Democratic base.15 David Byler’s column calling attention to the 
electable qualities of the then “second-tier” candidates singles out Harris and Booker 
as electable because of their “strong ties with black voters” that could “reenergize 
Obama voters who stayed home in 2016,” speaking to their ability to turn out the 
voters who helped propel the last Democratic president into office.  
 In May 2019, Bakari Sellers, a political commentator and former member of 
the South Carolina House of Representatives, proclaimed Kamala Harris to be the 
“the real electable Democrat.” He first decries the framing of electability as one that 
presents “the white male candidate” as “best suited to defeat Trump,” calling that 
 
15 This schema also allows for the possibility that voters can be energized against a candidate, as was 
likely the case for some 2016 voters on both sides—both candidates were historically unpopular 
(Saad). The authors sampled here, however, largely judge candidates on their ability to give voters 
something to vote for.  
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perspective “precisely the wrong way of looking at things.” He confronts the idea of 
which voters matter directly, noting that thoughts of “winning back Trump voters” 
being enough to swing the election are “mistaken” and that “Democrats simply won’t 
stand a chance in 2020 if we can’t energize African American voters,” framing the 
demographic as critically important to victory against Donald Trump and contrasting 
the narrative that the white working-class voters are the key to the election. He goes 
on to cite the previous electoral importance of black voters in previous elections as 
evidence that Harris’ appeal with the group will bring victory in November:  
The truth is, too many voters who supported President Obama in 2008 and 
2012 made a choice to stay home in 2016. In Wayne County, Michigan – 
home of Detroit, where Kamala Harris gave a speech addressing the 
“electability” conversation on Sunday – 37,000 fewer voters turned out in 
2016 than 2012. The county is 40% black. Given that Hillary Clinton lost 
Michigan by fewer than 11,000 votes, it is reasonable to assume this turnout 
drop cost Democrats the state. It’s worth remembering that the last “electable” 
Democrat won by energizing African Americans, young voters, suburban 
voters, progressives, and Latinos. He was uniquely positioned to make the 
argument most central at that time: We need change. He also was a black man 
named Barack Hussein Obama.  
 
Here, Sellers first relies on statistics from 2016 that contradict the dominant narrative 
that Clinton lost midwestern states because of the shift among white working-class 
voters; rather, he highlights credible statistics that demonstrate the fall in black 
turnout may be responsible for Trump’s victory. His choice to describe that lower 
turnout as the consequence of voters who “made a choice to stay home” relies upon 
the schema identified above, framing black voters’ decisions as not of who to vote for, 
but of whether to vote at all—choosing not to turn out if both candidates fail to 
energize them. In doing so, he frames the key to Democratic success as nominating a 
candidate who can inspire and drive turnout among black voters, rather than focusing 
on ones who can recover the white working-class. Throughout his piece, Sellers notes 
Harris’ repeated appeals to these voters, implicitly tying her to the constituency he has 
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framed Democrats as needing to win back the White House. The reference of 
Obama’s full name serves to remind audiences that candidates whose candidates who 
may seem to flout common sense about electability have won before—Obama’s 
middle name is also the last name of the Iraqi president when Bush started the war in 
Iraq.16  In doing so, he positively frames the electability of not only Harris, but all of 
the non-white, non-male candidates in the race.  
 In an opinion piece for The Guardian in which he argues that “Trump will run 
rings [a]round Biden,” Nathan Robinson, author of Why You Should Be a Socialist, 
compares the enthusiasm of Biden’s voters to that of the incumbent president:  
At the same time, compared to Trump, Biden has: 
No money 
No voter enthusiasm 
No organization 
No agenda 
Ask yourself: how likely is such a candidate to win? Look at the enthusiasm 
Trump gets at his rallies. It is real. Trump has fans, and they’re highly 
motivated. How motivated are Biden’s “fans”? Is Biden going to fill stadiums? 
Are people going to crisscross the country knocking on doors for him? Say 
what you want about Clinton, but there were some truly committed Clinton 
fans, and she had a powerful base of support. By comparison, Biden looks 
weak, and Trump is savagely effective at preying on and destroying 
establishment politicians.  
 
From the beginning of this section, Robinson directly frames a potential Biden 
campaign as ineffectual against Trump, which serves as a direct counternarrative to 
the idea that Biden is the most electable. By first listing a litany of areas where the 
campaign lacks any infrastructure, he negatively portrays the campaign before listing 
the rhetorical question—“How likely is such a candidate to win?”—which, in light of 
the opening lines, is designed to be answered “no” by the reader. Robinson uses 
Trump as an example of someone who successfully energized voters, relying on the 
 
16 Bush made Hussein the public-facing villain during the war; for more context, see George Lakoff’s 
“Metaphor and War: The Metaphor System Used to Justify War in the Gulf.”  
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schema above; by repeatedly noting the “enthusiasm” Trump has generated among 
them and how “motivated” they are to support his candidacy for the White House.    
If Biden indeed has “no voter enthusiasm,” his ability to energize voters—and 
consequently win the election—is doubtful. The series of rhetorical questions that 
follow, all of which presuppose that the reader will answer negatively, all further 
build upon the ways campaigns who energize voters can motivate others to vote for 
their candidate (campaign rallies, knocking doors for the candidate)—Robinson 
frames a Biden general election campaign as unable to rely on these. Robinson’s use 
of violent imagery—painting Trump as savagely effective and preying on the former 
Vice President—applies a metaphor of predation to the general election, whereby 
candidates who struggle to use these tools to motivate voters are particularly 
vulnerable.  
Progressive 
 Ideology also serves as a quality for this facet of electability, though at the 
opposite end of the spectrum from the previous prototype. Building upon the schema 
that VOTERS ARE INERT AND NEED TO BE ENERGIZED TO VOTE, arguers 
who note a candidate should be progressive note that members of the Democratic base 
are energized by progressive policies and will not only be more reluctant to vote on 
Election Day if the nominee does not offer an agenda that inspires them, but will also 
be more susceptible to propaganda encouraging this lack of turnout.  
 In the second night of the July Debates, moderator Jake Tapper furthered the 
frame of Biden’s candidacy as unappealing to progressives. He first noted that “there 
is a big debate… about the best way Democrats can win back Michigan,” and that the 
night before, Elizbeth Warren had advocated for “big, structural change.” He then 
went on to ask Biden:  
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What do you say to progressives who worry that your proposals are not 
ambitious enough to energize the progressive wing of your party, which you 
will need to beat Donald Trump? 
 
The latter half of Tapper’s statement directly acknowledges that Democrats cannot 
“beat Donald Trump” without the support of the progressive wing. Relying on the 
presentation of voters as inert via the word energize, Tapper’s question works to 
present concerns about Biden’s ability to act as the catalyst for voter turnout needed to 
be successful in the general election.  
 Russian disinformation was also used to target voters who did not feel 
motivated to vote for Clinton—Kendi, the American University professor quoted at 
the beginning of this section, directly addresses the possibility of such disinformation 
occurring again in a second Atlantic piece entitled “Why I Fear a Moderate 
Democratic Nominee.” He notes that the Senate Intelligence Committee found that 
black Americans were targeted the most by Russian propaganda, specifically with 
posts that advocated for them to either stay home or vote for Jill Stein, the 2016 Green 
Party candidate whose candidacy may have contributed to Clinton’s loss—if every 
Stein voter had voted for Clinton in Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Michigan, the 
former Secretary of State would have won those states and consequently, the election 
(Golshan).   
Democrats should be more worried about a moderate nominee being out of 
touch with winnable voters. Eighty- three percent of Obama-to-Trump swing 
voters who switched back to the Democratic Party in 2018 support Medicare 
for All, nearly mirroring the overwhelming support among other swing voters 
who voted Obama, didn’t vote in 2016, and then voted for Democrats in the 
2018 midterms. These two groups also opposed Trump’s decision to withdraw 
from the Paris climate agreement, supported a $12 minimum wage, and 
backed a millionaire’s tax at similarly high rates. These two seemingly distinct 
groups of swing voters (one prototypically white, the other prototypically 
young and black)… may be most closely aligned with progressive candidates. 
This pumps the heart of electability—any progressive nominee would have 
clear pathways to two of the most important groups of swing voters whom 




Kendi begins his framing here with a warning to Democrats, noting that they “should 
be more concerned” about nominating a candidate who does not appeal to “winnable” 
voters—that is, voters who can be persuaded to vote for the Democratic nominee. The 
perception of such voters is at the core of all of the electability arguments sampled in 
this paper, as each arguer makes the case that their preferred candidate will better 
appeal to the most voters; by leading this passage with an appeal that Democrats are 
in danger of nominating someone “out of touch” with these voters, Kendi makes a 
very explicit argument that what follows may help Democrats win the election. The 
two groups he identifies both voted for Democrats in the 2018 midterm elections—
primarily white voters who voted for Trump in 2016 and predominately black voters 
who did not vote in 2016—speak to groups who are typically framed in disparate 
terms with different desires from a nominee. That Kendi gives a litany of policy 
issues on which these groups agree, from Medicare for All to a wealth tax, frames 
them as jointly “winnable” by a candidate who supports these policies—in this case, a 
progressive. Kendi’s use of metaphor in the last line, saying that understanding the 
appeal of progressive policies to these groups “pumps the heart of electability” 
renders the nomination of a progressive candidate central to winning the presidency in 
2020.  
Withstand Trump Attacks  
 Often pointing to the chaotic disinformation of the 2016 election and the way 
Trump and the media manipulated Clinton’s email scandal to the level of a criminal 
conspiracy, many argue that the nominee must be able to withstand such rhetorical 
falsehoods to succeed in the general election. This electability criterion is generally 
framed as a reflection of a candidate’s response to campaign challenges, rather than 
their innate appeal to various subsections of the population. Sellers’ piece on Kamala 
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Harris, for instance, notes that her prosecutorial skills, leading to impressive 
questioning of administration witnesses in the Senate, demonstrates that she can “take 
the fight directly to Trump,” positively framing her electability because of her 
potential to challenge the incumbent on a rhetorical level in the general election.  
This prototype also presumes that the media landscape will fundamentally 
change from the primary to the general election, and that the candidate Democrats 
choose should be the best prepared for that rhetorical shift. Hence, the prototype 
rewards candidates like Harris who demonstrate skills that extend to a protracted fight 
or who have limited issues in their background. Candidates like Joe Biden, by 
contrast, who carry decades of political history that can be weaponized, have their 
electability framed negatively here.  
For instance, Paul Waldman, in a December 2019 column for The Washington 
Post, argues that:  
Any Democratic nominee will face a similar version of the right’s campaign of 
vilification, not to mention a news media that is likely to rerun the “But Her 
Emails” debacle of 2016, elevating some small weakness or misstep in the 
Democrat’s history into a Watergate-level scandal. The most skilled 
candidates, like Obama and Bill Clinton, were able to overcome what was 
thrown at them, and it’s perfectly reasonable to ask which candidate is best 
able to withstand the assault. Biden might be that candidate, but looking over 
his career I see reason for skepticism. 
 
Here, Waldman creates the image of a dangerous rhetorical situation for the 2020 
nominee. He begins this framework by evoking the phrase “But Her Emails,” a 
reference to a common criticism of Clinton by Trump and his surrogates in 2016. 
Despite an FBI probe that revealed no criminal conduct (Edmondson), her use of a 
private email server while Secretary of State, the phrase became such a dominant 
news story in the race to the point that “emails” became the word voters most 
associated with her (Cillizza “Clinton Email”). The inclusion of the line undoubtedly 
reminds loyal Democratic voters (who constitute those deciding the Democratic 
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nominee) of what stark rhetorical challenges can impede the nominee. That he further 
describes these potential challenges as “small weaknesses” transformed into 
“Watergate-level scandals” further compounds the risks of choosing a nominee with 
an exploitable past. Waldman makes Biden into a risky candidate by further noting 
that the latter’s career gives “reason for skepticism” about his ability to “withstand the 
assault,” a term that conveys violence, paints a vivid description of the rhetorical 
challenges facing the potential nominee. The weaknesses he mentions, coupled with 
his direct statement that the Vice President’s career gives “reason for skepticism” 
about his ability to survive a general election fight, all frames Biden’s electability as 
doubtful.  
 Kendi’s piece on the benefits of a progressive nominee also speaks to potential 
problems with Biden’s record that would make him vulnerable in a general election:  
Young black swing voters who are not supporting Biden are more likely to be 
progressive and less likely to identify as Democrats than their elders. They 
look at Biden’s record—from pushing “tough on crime” and welfare-reform 
legislation to mistreating Anita Hill during the Clarence Thomas hearings to 
demeaning black parents—and are repelled. Like Clinton’s super-predator 
video, I fear Biden’s record can push the other swing voters into not voting. 
 
Here, Kendi builds upon the frame that Clinton’s record hurt turnout among black 
voters in 2016 and applies the same frame to Biden. After mentioning the Russian 
disinformation that targets black voters and encourages them not to vote, he further 
frames young black voters as distant from the Democratic Party, by noting that they 
may not even identify as Democrats. That he further describes young black voters as 
repelled by Biden’s policies, a term that carries a sharply negative connotation, 
further casts Biden’s candidacy as alienating to a group whose support is crucial to 
winning the election.  
The mention of Clinton’s “super-predator” video refers to a comment the then-
First Lady made while supporting the 1994 Crime Control and Prevention Act 
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(infamous now for policies that disproportionately harmed black and Latino 
communities with harsh punishments, including for non-violent crimes). Her 
comments worked members of gangs and drug cartels “super-predators” and justify 
the need for harsh criminal justice penalties (Cramer and Sands). These comments 
served as a base for attacks on Clinton by Trump campaign surrogates to portray her 
as harmful to the black community—and therefore discouraging black voters from 
supporting her (CNN, “Trump Dredges”). In paralleling Biden’s record to this 
vulnerability in Clinton’s past, Kendi frames a potential Biden candidacy similarly 
flawed.  
Kendi’s argument subsequently parallels Biden’s electoral vulnerabilities with 
Clinton’s by naming two distinct areas where he has harmed the community—much 
like Clinton, advocating for “tough-on-crime” policies, and his role in the Clarence 
Thomas hearings and Anita Hill’s allegations of sexual harassment that arose during 
them. The first echoes Clinton’s “super predators” comment in the impact it had on 
the black community—both contributed to the tough on crime policies that resulted in 
mass incarceration. The second adds a vulnerability that Clinton did not face (her 
husband was not yet President); this one, arguably more specific to black women. 
Biden chaired the Judiciary Committee while Thomas’ confirmation hearings 
unfolded; his critics allege that he could have called more witnesses that supported 
Hill’s account and stopped his Republican colleagues from attacking her (Zhou).  
Hence, not only does Kendi frame Biden as not only having the same vulnerability 
that subjected Clinton, who lost to Trump, to weaknesses in the general election, but a 
further one that might harm his electability even more.  
Age is also rendered a potential liability in a general election, particularly for 
the three septuagenarian candidates (Biden, Sanders, and Warren), who in mid-
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October were the three leading candidates. David Byler, a Washington Post 
columnist, notes this in his October column. He first notes that both parties “blew it” 
in 2016 by “failing to nominate their most viable candidates,” directly calling the 
audience’s attention to the importance of the nomination process in finding a 
candidate who can appeal to the general population. He then goes on to note that both 
Trump and Clinton had qualities that resulted in their success in the primary but 
damage to their candidacy in the general election; Trump’s ability to “deprive his 
opponents of media oxygen” became a host of scandals in the general, while Clinton’s 
use of “political muscle” to “clear the field” of potential primary challengers allowed 
Trump to “portray her as a creature of the ‘swamp.” Such framing reminds the 
audience that some qualities that bolster candidates during a primary election can 
negatively impact them in the general—and that success in the former does not 
guarantee a win in November. In addition to mentioning the ideologies of Sanders and 
Warren as liabilities, Byler notes that none of the then-frontrunners “are particularly 
young… 78, 76, and 70 years old” and that “Americans have expressed real 
discomfort with candidates older than 70,” raising potential general election liabilities 
for all of them.  
The impeachment proceedings against Donald Trump complicate this facet of 
electability, particularly for Biden. In September of 2019, the public was notified of 
an anonymous whistleblower complaint that alleged President Trump had withheld 
congressionally approved aid for Ukraine because he wanted the country to 
investigate Hunter Biden, the former Vice President’s son, who served on the board of 
Burisma, an oil and gas company in Ukraine (Blake). During that time, a Ukrainian 
prosecutor was fired for failing to investigate corruption—the opposite of Trump’s 
allegation that he was fired for investigating Burisma (Blake). While there is no 
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evidence that the Bidens committed any sort of wrongdoing, many argue that the 
repeated mentions of his name in connection to Ukraine would open opportunities for 
disinformation campaigns to target low-information voters and convince them that 
Biden engaged in corruption. Eugene Robinson, columnist at The Washington Post, 
for instance, argues the following from a January 30, 2020 column urging Democrats 
to “pick the best Democrat to beat Donald Trump”:  
Trump’s arms-for-investigations shakedown of Ukraine was always about the 
election. He knew that Biden could wipe the floor with him, so he brought out 
the playbook he used in 2016. “Her emails” was replaced with “Hunter 
Biden.”… Fairly or not, this does raise vital questions for Biden and for voters 
who believe that Trump must be defeated at all costs. If Biden is the nominee, 
there is no question he will face an unending barrage of unfair attacks. 
“Burisma” will become a Trump rallying cry the way “Benghazi” was four 
years ago.  
Here, Kendi references two right-wing talking points about Clinton that would 
undoubtedly be familiar to those who paid close attention to the race in 2016. Both 
“her emails,” in reference to the email scandal discussed above, and “Benghazi,” a 
reference to the 2012 terrorist attack on the US Embassy in Benghazi, serve to remind 
the reader of attacks Trump and his supporters lobbied against Clinton throughout the 
campaign as evidence of her alleged corruption. In equating these phrases to two that 
are associated with Joe Biden—"Hunter Biden” and “Burisma”—Kendi portrays a 
general election campaign headed by Biden that is again inundated by misinformation 
that disparages the Democratic nominee. In portraying Biden as particularly 
vulnerable to this sort of general election campaign, Kendi reinforces the idea that 
Biden’s electability would suffer in a general election.  
Identity 
 As mentioned in the introduction to this paper, I am particularly interested in 
examining how electability discussions impact candidates of different identities. The 
following section will explore how media narratives about the 2020 candidates’ 
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chances explicitly and implicitly discuss their varying identities as either liabilities or 
strengths in a potential general election competition against Trump. Of the eight of the 
major candidates left in the race at by February 2020, only one (Tulsi Gabbard) is 
non-white, and five are male. These candidates at large are not demographically 
representative of the Democratic party base, which is predominately women and 
people of color. Electability may be at least partially to blame for this lack of 
diversity; lack of funds can cause candidates to drop out before any voters have had 
the chance to vote—and donors and individual voters may be wary about giving 
money to candidates they fear cannot defeat Trump.  
Gender 
 This last category, which frames male nominees as particularly effective at 
appealing to the most voters, is more nuanced than the other categories, but equally 
significant. Hillary Clinton undoubtedly faced sexism in her 2016 run, and that sexism 
is often implicitly framed as a weakness for female candidates in a general election, 
hampering their electability. Polling about the 2020 race often finds that voters are 
wary that other voters will refuse to vote for someone—a June 2019 poll, for instance, 
found that while 74% of respondents indicated they would be comfortable with a 
female president, only 33% believed their neighbors would be comfortable, a stark 
difference (Ipsos). As electability rests on what voters believe others want in a 
candidate, such beliefs do not bode well for the women candidates in the race.   
 Early discussion of the potential candidates, which included a record number 
of women, focused on doubts voters and Democratic Party officials had about the 
possibility of a woman president in 2020. A January 2019 piece in The New York 
Times begins by highlighting the doubts of women who want to see a woman 
president, noting that:  
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Joyce Cusack would love to see a woman as president in her lifetime. But she 
isn’t sure it should happen in 2020… Too many Americans may not want to 
‘take another chance’ on a female candidate, Ms. Cusack said, after Hillary 
Clinton was met with mistrust and even hostility in swing states (Lerer and 
Chira).  
 
Here, the nomination of a woman is framed as a potential liability for Democrats in 
2020, and consequently something that voters concerned about beating Donald Trump 
should take into consideration. That the first woman cited is framed as passionate 
about a woman in office—she would purportedly “love to see a woman as 
president”—but skeptical about any woman’s success in 2020 presents the idea that 
doubts about women’s chances of success are so strong they are coming from even 
those who support them. The use of the word should here is particularly noteworthy, 
as it attaches a sense of obligation to the idea of not having a female president—that 
is, rather than dismissing the possibility of a female nominee, the frame suggests that 
nominating a woman would be damaging to Democrats, and so should not occur. This 
danger is made especially pronounced by the reminder of the Clinton campaign’s 
failure and the phrase “take another chance” to refer to a potential candidacy of a 
woman. Though the article does include counterpoints and quotes from strategists 
who argue the benefits of a woman leading the presidential ticket, the entire premise 
of the article rests on the fact that there are sustained doubts about the success of a 
woman leading the presidential ticket—doubts that voters afraid of any weaknesses 
that could aid Trump’s reelection campaign would likely take seriously.  
 Coverage of individual female candidates also often raised doubts about their 
ability to succeed. The day Elizabeth Warren announced her candidacy, for instance, 
Politico correspondent Natasha Korecki wrote an article entitled “Elizabeth Warren 
Battles the Ghosts of Hillary.” While the article primarily focuses on Warren’s 
viability—her likelihood of winning the Democratic primary—those chances are 
67 
 
discussed in terms of factors that caused Clinton to lose in the general election, hence 
implicitly suggesting potential weaknesses in Warren’s electability. Discussing the 
narratives that have emerged about Warren’s candidacy, Korecki notes:  
She’s too divisive and too liberal, Washington Democrats have complained 
privately. Her DNA rollout was a disaster — and quite possibly a White 
House deal-breaker. She’s already falling in the polls, and — perhaps most 
stinging — shares too many of the attributes that sank Hillary Clinton. In the 
year of the woman, it adds up to one unwelcome mat for the most prominent 
woman likely to be part of the 2020 field. But it also presents an unmistakable 
challenge: How does Warren avoid a Clinton redux — written off as too 
unlikable before her campaign gets off the ground? 
 
Here, Korecki frames Warren’s candidacy, still nascent at that point, as a troubled 
one. Though not all of the problems Korecki describes result from Warren’s gender, 
the one she labels “most stinging,” suggesting it could deliver the strongest damage to 
the Massachusetts’ Senator’s campaign, is the comparison to Hillary Clinton. Korecki 
furthers the idea that the gender-based comparisons to Clinton’s campaign are 
damaging to her by calling them an “unmistakable challenge.” Korecki’s argument 
that Warren’s campaign could become a “Clinton redux” serves to remind audiences 
of the struggles the last woman nominee faced, dismissed by the sexist trope of 
“unlikeable” “before her campaign got off the ground”—and consequently suggesting 
that Warren is more likely to suffer the same fate. As noted above, a number of the 
media narratives explaining why Clinton won characterized her as the wrong 
candidate for the election—too unpopular to beat Trump. Consequently, in suggesting 
that Warren could be unable to overcome perceptions that she is unlikeable, Korecki 
implicitly frames her gender as a weakness for the general election.  
 In media articles about voters’ considerations of electability, Warren’s 
candidacy is consistently framed as a risky one that causes those who would 
otherwise support her to choose other candidates. In the January 2020 Reuters article 
cited above, for instance, Ax and Lewis use Warren’s campaign as the frame for their 
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discussion of the choices voters are making as a result of concerns about electability. 
The article starts by discussing a volunteer for Warren’s campaign working to 
“convince voters to cast their lot with” the candidate. The terms “cast” and “lot” in 
particular evoke games of chance, in direct opposition to the security typically offered 
by candidates framed as likely to win the general election in November. The article 
then notes the concerns voters have regarding Warren’s electability, specifically that 
“her liberal stances would not draw enough broad support to defeat… Donald Trump 
in November” before noting that many voters were making facing similar “head-vs-
heart dilemma[s],” reinforcing the idea that Warren’s candidacy is one that, in the 
face of Trump’s potential reelection, makes emotional but not logical sense.  
The authors then go on to quote several people who decided against voting for 
Warren because of these electability concerns. Even the voter who they quote as 
labelling “electability” as code for misogyny has Warren listed as his second choice, 
behind Pete Buttigieg. While the article is not solely focused on Warren—the authors 
do go on to discuss Sanders’ record in the same context—they only quote one voter 
deciding against him, compared with two for Warren. This, coupled with the fact that 
anecdotes about the Warren campaign’s attempts to convince voters she is electable 
serve as both the opening and closing anecdotes, emphasizes Warren as the primary 
candidate voters are abandoning for others in light of electability concerns.   
News frames also use the candidacy of Kamala Harris, the only black woman 
and the only Asian American woman in the race, to question whether Americans 
would vote for a woman of color to occupy the White House. Much like with Warren, 
profiles of Harris frequently refer to potential sexism and racism as burdens for her to 
enter the White House, again raising doubts about her campaign’s longevity through 
November. In November 2019, less than a month before her campaign ended, ABC 
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News ran an article originally titled “Is Kamala Harris Proof That America isn’t 
Ready for a Woman of Color as President?” Such framing renders the very act of 
being a black woman potentially detrimental to a presidential campaign and offers 
Harris’ fading candidacy as “proof,” further cementing the idea that women of color 
cannot win the presidency. In framing Harris’ candidacy as a referendum on whether 
Americans will vote for a woman of color, these frames legitimize the idea that the 
status of being a non-white and non-male is something that voters may not “be ready” 
to accept—an election weakness that voters concerned about electability may take 
into consideration of their vote. To their credit, ABC did change the headline to read 
that “Sen. Kamala Harris Questions Whether America Would Elect a Woman of 
Color,” a reflection of something Harris herself asked at a campaign event, placing 
the focus on the candidate’s words rather than what her campaign means for women 
candidates of color at large.  
 Many media frames discussing electability in concert with gender note that the 
term is frequently deployed against women and minority candidates but does embody 
valid concerns many voters have about the way such candidates will be treated in a 
general election campaign, evoking the concerns about candidates’ abilities to 
withstand general election attacks that dominate the second prototype of electability 
discussed above.  
 In January, discussions about the supposed electability of women candidates 
reached a fever pitch when reports arose that Senator Bernie Sanders had purportedly 
told Elizabeth Warren in a private conversation that he did not believe a woman could 
defeat Donald Trump. In much of the media reaction, arguers forcefully deny that 
sentiment, taking great lengths to note that both women regularly win elections and 
that Hillary Clinton won the popular vote. That said, however, they also tend to 
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accompany such rebuttals with an acknowledgement that voters have many fears 
about have the gender-based attacks Trump would use against a woman candidate. In 
doing so, such references allude to the “ability to stand up to Trump attacks” quality 
outlined in the second electability prototype.  
Li Zhou, for instance, writing for Vox on the debate between the candidates, 
writes:  
Part of the reason Sanders’s purported comments have prompted such a 
response is that they wade into assumptions some voters have expressed about 
the electability of a woman president... Effectively, because of Hillary 
Clinton’s loss in 2016, some voters are concerned a woman won’t be able to 
defeat Trump due to the sexism she’ll face from other voters. 
 
Here, Zhou explicitly notes that women candidates’ gender is a concern for 
electability-minded voters, hence framing gender as a potential general election 
liability in the views of some. In tying these concerns to Clinton’s loss, Zhou makes 
an explicit connection to electability in light of the Democrats’ loss in 2016, the 
driving force behind much of modern-day discussions about electability. While Zhou 
does note that the assumption “doesn’t account for the many factors that contributed 
to Hillary Clinton’s defeat,” she does acknowledge that women candidates do face 
sexism, a potential hurdle in a general election. That such discussions occur as a result 
of comments from Bernie Sanders—who is often framed negatively by the first 
electability prototype, but positively by the second—suggests that even those who 
eschew the notion that a candidate be moderate to appeal to the white-working class 
may still carry reservations about women candidates’ electability, presenting gender 
as an even larger liability than the ideology of candidates.   
At the same time, some commentators do push back on the idea that women’s 
gender is a liability. Cited above, Bakari Sellers’ article in support of Kamala Harris 
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actively notes that the term is often used to bolster white men. Elizabeth Weil’s May 
2019 profile of Kamala Harris for The Atlantic further notes that:  
Has the United States dealt with its own racism and misogyny enough to 
elect a black woman president? There’s little rational basis for saying yes. 
But there was little rational basis for believing that a man named Barack 
Hussein Obama could win the White House either, let alone a huckster 
named Donald Trump. 
 
Here, Weil frames Harris’ race and gender not as liabilities, but potential boons to her 
candidacy by reminding her audience of previous candidates who were presumed to 
be unelectable—both of whom went on to win the White House. Much like Sellers, 
her use of Obama’s middle name reminds audiences that conventional wisdom about 
electability in 2007 framed the former president as unelectable. In calling Trump a 
“huckster,” a term with highly negative connotations, she further frames the 2016 
election results as unexpected, calling into question those who believe that electability 
can be deduced on a “rational basis” of believing who will win the presidency.  
 Similarly, Nia-Malika Henderson, writing for CNN in May 2019 about 
remarks Kamala Harris made at an NAACP event decrying the male whiteness of 
“electability,” points out the biases inherent in the term. She opens her piece reacting 
to Harris’ remarks with the line “Finally, someone said it,” expressing exasperation 
with the way the concept has been presented. She goes on to note that the term is 
about “the power of whiteness” that allows candidates like Biden and Buttigieg to 
appeal to the Midwest, pointing out the inherent biases in discussions of 
“electability.” While articles like these undoubtedly help to counter the prevailing 
prototypes of electable candidates, they are still less common than the articles 
elevating the electability of white male candidates. Even Henderson’s article ends 
with a quote from a black woman saying that a Harris presidency is “not going to 
happen” because “black women are at the bottom,” extending the idea that voters 
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believe electoral success is reserved for those who belong to less marginalized 
identity groups.  
 This is not to say that there are not valid criticisms of all the female candidates 
or that sexism is wholly to blame for the end of their campaigns; there are 
multifaceted reasons, from Harris’ record on criminal justice earning her scrutiny 
from the left to Klobuchar’s lack of support with black voters, an obstacle shared by 
the other midwestern candidates, that the women candidates have struggled. However, 
given the extreme importance voters have placed on nominating someone who can 
“beat Trump” in this election, any doubt cast on a candidate’s ability to win the White 
House in November carries profound importance, and may hurt the fundraising 
abilities of the candidates deemed “not electable” and preventing them from staying in 
the race longer. Especially given that Warren, who is arguably less ideologically 
extreme than Sanders, is frequently cited as a candidate who voters would pick if they 
were not concerned about Trump’s reelection, there is definite evidence that concerns 
about electability have harmed women candidates. FiveThirtyEight, for instance, 
surveyed 845 white Democratic voters in May 2019; women were initially eleven 
points more likely than man to choose a woman candidate, but after reading an article 
pointing to identity politics as the reason for Clinton’s loss, they were only six points 
more likely than the men, who were already more likely to blame identity politics for 
the 2016 results (Haines and Masket).  
 The repeated emphasis on electability in media frames surrounding Warren, 
Harris, and the other female candidates arguably functions as a similar primer to the 
articles showed to participants in the study; repeatedly emphasizing the vulnerabilities 
of women candidates in a general election and consequently rendering them 
unelectable. Hence, two years after 2018 was declared “The Year of the Woman,” the 
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women candidates for the presidency are still facing rhetorical barriers that prevent 
them from being framed as electable candidates for the presidency. Women 
candidates will undoubtedly continue to run for the presidency, and it will be 
interesting to see if, absent the threat of a Donald Trump reelection, arguers in the 
Democratic party still push back against women’s candidacies for fear of losing the 
general election.  
Discussion 
 At the time of this writing, Joe Biden has become the presumptive Democratic 
nominee; Bernie Sanders, the other remaining contender, ended his campaign on 
April 8, 2020. That the most diverse Democratic field in history narrowed to the two 
septuagenarian white men is who led in the early polls speaks to the power that 
electability narratives had in restraining candidates. Furthermore, the fact that the 
nominee is Biden, who has been the primary beneficiary of the first prototype of 
electability in this paper, further impresses the importance of these electability 
narratives in determining which candidates are not only successful, but are able to 
stay in the race (Biden had poor results in the first two contests but his campaign 
survived).  
This is not to say that the electability narratives have singularly driven voters’ 
choice of nominee, but that in context of the fears of Democrats about this election 
year, electability narratives are particularly powerful in shaping which candidates sit 
higher in the polls and how long they can afford to stay in the race. As discussed 
above, the United States presidential primary is incredibly long, with candidates 
declaring more than a full year before the first votes are cast, consequently requiring 
profound amounts of spending by campaigns in order to stay in the race. Despite the 
diverse candidates, by the time voters in the Iowa caucus had their say, they were 
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choosing from eleven candidates—only three of whom were people of color and only 
three of whom were women. By the Nevada caucuses (the third state to vote), they 
were choosing from eight major candidates—of whom there were three women and 
one person of color. By Super Tuesday, that number dwindled to four major 
candidates—all septuagenarian white people, three men and one woman (Elizabeth 
Warren).  
Polling of voters also reflects the idea that “electability” concerns affect their 
choices in the Democratic primary. In June 2019, a poll conducted by research firm 
Avalanche asked voters which candidate they would vote for if the primary were held 
then and which candidate they would vote for if they had a “magic wand” to make 
any candidate automatically ascend to the presidency. The preferences for these two 
questions changed dramatically, with support for Joe Biden falling from 29% support 
to 19% and nearly every other candidate rising; Elizabeth Warren had the sharpest 
increase, going from 16% to 23% (Avalanche, “Electability”). Such a shift indicates 
the power electability narratives have over voter preference and may help to explain 
why the Democratic field narrowed the way it did, with many women and people of 
color exiting the field before voting. As women candidates and people of color 
continue to fight for the presidency, understanding how these narratives were created 
may help them to further develop rhetorical strategies that push back against such 
narratives and counter their influence on their campaign.  
  The first electability prototype has arguably been the most dominant 
throughout the election cycle, consequently placing the concerns of the white 
working-class at the forefront. This is particularly pronounced in the elevation of both 
Pete Buttigieg and Amy Klobuchar, who had low polling numbers overall but even 
worse numbers among black voters,  sometimes polling at 0% among them (Hensley-
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Clancy and Cramer) as particularly electable, while candidates of color like Cory 
Booker and Kamala Harris, who had similarly low polling numbers but performed 
better than Buttigieg and Klobuchar among black voters (King), ended their 
campaigns before voting began.  
It should be noted, however, that Joe Biden, long framed as the most electable 
by those who elevate the importance of the white working-class, is the presumptive 
nominee in large part due to his overwhelming support among older black voters. 
More sophisticated analysis on the reasons for this support have been done during the 
election cycle by journalists like Astead Herndon of the New York Times and Maya 
King of Politico; their analyses provide insight into the multifaceted reasons for the 
level of support Biden has among the group, including, but not only, their electability 
concerns.  
That said, the goal of this paper is not to examine the support different 
demographics gave to different candidates but rather how the media elevates specific 
candidates and voter concerns.  That Buttigieg and Klobuchar—the candidates with 
the least appeal among black voters but perceived appeal to white voters—were the 
ones who dominated among the first two contests, which are predominately white, 
meant that other candidates, who may have had more pull among black voters but 
struggled in white states like New Hampshire and Iowa, were unable to stay in the 
race long enough to garner delegates from states with larger minority populations.   
 There are further avenues for research that could provide more insight into the 
success or failure of specific candidates in this race. Due to space constraints, this 
paper does not consider the impact of horse race coverage, for instance, which 
appears to sharply impact which candidate voters say they are going to support at the 
polls.  After the South Carolina primary, for instance, news coverage of Joe Biden’s 
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campaign dramatically shifted, positioning him as the dominant frontrunner where the 
week before his campaign had been presented as a failing one. Nor does it examine 
the impact of how polls of potential general election races between Trump and 
individual nominees are framed. Because my sole focus has been how candidates are 
described in relation to their general election prospects, this paper did not look at 
more coded language used only to critique women candidates or candidates of color, 
like “aggressive,” “cold,” and “angry,” because such discussions are often either in 
more conservative newspapers that were not the focus of this paper (The Daily Beast,  
The New York Post, etc.) or mired in discussions about candidate’s viability (chance 
of winning the nomination) rather than their general election prospects. Investigations 
of the discourse surrounding the candidates using this language would likely shed 
further insight into the rhetorical forces impacting the 2020 candidates.  
 That said, however, “electability” has so dominated discussions of the 2020 
candidates that it is has played a substantial role in which candidates have succeeded 
in the contests thus far—and which candidates’ campaigns were able to last long 
enough to reach a voting contest. While these concerns, which disproportionately 
harm women candidates, candidates of color, and progressive candidates, are 
ostensibly merely out of a fear of Donald Trump, it remains to be seen if such 
concerns are further echoed in 2024 and future presidential contests. Especially as the 
Electoral College, which elevates the votes of smaller states often perceived to have 
larger white working-class populations, remains more important to the election 
outcomes than the popular vote, prototypes of electability may continue to remain 
focused on white men who can best appeal to these voters, rather than to the 
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